Bulgakov seems to echo Origen regarding eternal creation, but Lossky – Athanasius, who deemed creation in time from God’s will rather than nature.
Related to distinctions of Norris Clarke: esse naturale v intentionale & Palamas: essence v energies.
Catherine Keller’s tehomic panentheism via creatio ex profundis makes sense to me as an eternal act, where the order of existence was the formless void of Genesis.
CS Peirce affirms the atemporal Reality of God, where Being > Reality > Existence, denying God’s an existent. To that being:reality distinction, I impute naturale:intentionale & essence:energy distinctions.
The Reality of God would freely proceed as energeia, per divine will, diffusing the tehom’s substrative forms w/divinizing finalities, that they may participate imitatively.
Eternal creatio ex profundis & an in-time creatio continua preserve divine transcendence without sacrificing an intimate relationality, integral to a more robustly personalistic theology. (I’m trying to reconcile these approaches in resonance w/some of Staniloae’s intuitions.)
Re: exemplary or imaginal causes, debates arise as to whether they reduce to formal, final or even efficient causes. Some even include them as a 5th cause (material causation the only one not already mentioned here). In determinate reality, w/a an irreducibly triadic modal ontology, where existence, efficient & formal causes are acts, & essence, material & final causes are potencies, & where modal probabilities map to formal distinctions, this integral irreducibility of properties, haecceities & relations might account for such confusion? I point out such confusion b/c, for some theologians, exemplars, exemplarity & exemplarism in God are central. And if confusion reigns re same in created realities … Once adopted, though, a symphonic harmony of integrally related, inseparable dynamics ensue, like, for example, generation, creation, emanation, communication, incarnation, manifestation, participation, consummation, etc, which similarly will evoke various notions of causation (e.g. efficient, final & exemplary). The identity of manifold uncreated exemplars w/ the divine essence preserves simplicity as they’re non-beings, known but not real. As for created beings, they’re cognized by God’s cognizing Himself as their Cause. His creating the cosmos, as an accidental Cambridge property, is compatible w/simplicity. It’s also compatible w/an infinitely non-compelled act, i.e. w/freedom as apophatically predicated, guaranteeing its logical consistency w/other God-conceptions, ergo, a trans-freedom (non-anthropomorphic quality). I lean toward the stance of Bulgakov, who seems to echo Origen regarding eternal creation, though sympathetic to Lossky, too, who followed Athanasius in deeming creation in time as from God’s will rather than nature. But, where was I when the morning stars sang together?