The Eminent Intelligibility of Classical Theism

Prologue to what was previously published below.

Below are rather cryptic notes to myself, addressing how I would incorporate a modal identity metaontology into my modal ontological conceptions. To unpack this project a tad more & hopefully decrypt some of the jargon below, consider:

I think of modal identity in primarily epistemic terms, but it certainly also entails at least some vague ontological specifications (even when only via apophasis) & imparts some dispositional axiological implications. This is to say that I believe that divine syllogistics regarding essential propria (e.g. truth, beauty & goodness) & hypostatic idiomata (e.g. Father, Son & Spirit) very much matter for our worship, our transformation & such.

Meta-ontologically, I conceive divine being as nondeterminate and/or self determinate, while contingent being presents as variously (in terms of degrees) in/determinate. I categorize in/determinate realities per a modal ontology, which recognizes its radical temporality.

Divine syllogistics & Aristotelian syllogistics intersect determinately, only in the category of formal modal identity. Otherwise, regarding modal identities, it’s a clear category error to equate divine essences & hypostases, for example, with contingent quiddities & haecceities, because they are otherwise distinguished as eternal vs temporal, as non- & self-determinate vs variously in/determinate, and so on.

In the category of formal modal identities, however, we can consider determinate effects, whether their causes are nondeterminate, self-determinate or in/determinate. Even allowing for divine determinate causes, still, those would be distinguishable from ordinary contingent determinate causes by their kenotic natures.

Divine determinate causes would include incarnational realities.

Divine determinate effects would originate from divine realities, including nondeterminate, self-determinate & kenotically determinate and would include, for example, vestigial effects in the gratuity of creation & theotic effects in the gratuity of grace, such effects as would otherwise be proper to no known contingent, determinate causes & which would be communicated via general & special divine revelations.

The Word remained what he was when he became flesh so that he who is over all & yet came among all through his humanity should keep in himself his transcendence & remain above the limitations of creation…he was alive even when his flesh was tasting death. (Cyril of Alexandria)

In the –

paterological ur-kenosis, the Father remained what He was in the generation of the Son & procession of the Spirit;

pneumatological kenosis, the Spirit remained the Holy Breath, when immanentized/presented in the gratuity of creation;

Christological kenosis, the Son remained divine, when incarnated/presented (via dyo/mia-physitism) in the gratuity of grace.

So kenosis has only ever entailed a qualified self-limitation or tzimtzum (not self-annihilation but self-contraction).

Formal identities of divine determinate realities (e.g. oikonomia & energeia) present via kenotic & synergistic trinitarian acts of the divine hypostases (personal identities), whether unoriginately nondeterminate, eternally self-determinate &/or kenotically determinate.


In what amounts to my pan-semio-entheistic theory of truth, I conceive five transcendentals per terms of an Ens Necessarium as Necessary Truth, Necessary Beauty, Necessary Goodness, Necessary Unity (Love) & Necessary Freedom. These five categories map to my conceptions of Lonergan’s conversions & imperatives as well as to a fivefold missiology, both pneumatological & Christological.

This is neither a Kantian nor transcendental Thomist approach, however, but grounded in a semiotic realism and advanced abductively from that naturalized epistemology, deriving from those participatory engagements with reality that rely on an axiological epistemology (per my Peircean-like theory of knowledge).

There’s a leap of faith required, to be sure, at an existential disjunction where nihilism, pantheism & classical theism present. see Note Below


Can one take my pan-semio-entheistic leap, within the contours of a classical theism, employing a logic that wouldn’t be considered adhocery & unamenable to normal syllogistic logic?

I believe so.

Conceiving my approach as a fallibilist abduction, then formalizing its phenomenology via a consistent predicate & propositional logic, employing modes of identity, we could establish that its reasoning regarding existents (creatures) would be a special case or reduction of the phenomenological syllogizing of my putative transcendentals.

Put more simply, creature-talk would employ metaphors of our normative Creator-talk, not vice versa.

My five transcendentals, then, will be imported into a classical trinitology. The conceptual bridges between it and Aristotelian logic have already been built by Sara Uckelman.

See: Uckelman, Sara L. (2010). Reasoning About the Trinity: A Modern Formalization of a Medieval System of Trinitarian Logic. In Logic in Religious Discourse. Schumann, Andrew Ontos. 216-239.

I will try to summarize her discourse below & apply it to my heuristics.

In avoiding both modalism & tritheism, while remaining consistent in trinitarian predication, one must recognize three modes of identity. Unlike modalism, which refers to a single object existing in one of these modes, a modal identity entails one object as being the same as another object in one of the modes of identity.

  • Essentially identical objects share the same essence (extensional identity).
  • Personally identical objects share the same properties & definitions (intentional identity).
  • Formally identical objects share a genus, sufficiently similar to be placed therein. (Abelard originally distinguished extensional from intentional identity.)

The above modes of identity can be applied to the trinitarian logic of the Athanasian Creed, but this divine syllogistics collapses when applied to existents, where Aristotelian syllogistics, instead, apply.

My modal schema, influenced by Peircean categories, where

Being > Reality > Relations > Existents

roughly & analogously maps to these modes of identity

Essential | Personal | Formal | Creatures

employing a predicate or propositional logic, which is meta-logical (while Aristotelian syllogistics employ a term logic).


Also see:

So, Trinitarian discourse can be affirmed as formally consistent and roughly maps, heuristically, to our meta-logical categories. Still, that affords us only analytical conceivability, a rather minimalist intelligibility?

Can a bridge be constructed to Aristotelian syllogistics? that we might gain some additional modicum of intelligibility?


First, we would recognize that, for existents (creatures), only the formal mode of identity obtains and essential & personal predications do not (i.e. in Aristotelian syllogistics).

So, can Aristotelian syllogistics yet be extracted from the mode of identity framework mindful of where such predications obtain or not?

If so, our trinitarian logic needn’t be considered adhocery & unamenable to normal syllogistic logic. Instead, our reasoning regarding existents (creatures) would be a special case as a reduction of trinitarian syllogizing.

We should remain mindful that, in relating propria of the essence, idioma of the hypostases & energeia of the Trinity, per Abelardian modes of identity (essentially, personally & formally), even if we suitably predicate these realities using apophasis, analogy, gerundives & such and remain otherwise consistent —-
still, because we only ever use partial references and not exhaustively complete definitions, a radical incompleteness will still afflict our trinitarian discourse.

For example, even when we’ve managed to avoid paralogisms by properly attending to our modes of identity, in order to disambiguate our categorical predications of divine terms (thereby making explicit identity types essencialiter vs personaliter vs formaliter), while we will have saved some of our most meaningful intuitions, still, mystery will perdure.

While our Peircean-like categories analogously map to our Aristotelian, Scotist & Thomist categories (like quiddity, haecceity, ousia, hypostasis and such), it’s not counterintuitive that the dissimilarities — between all of our approaches to temporal being (Peirce, Scotus, Thomist, etc) and our approach to nondeterminate & self-determinate being (with three modes of identity) — will be located essentially & hypostatically vis a vis the modes of identity. The categories of essential-hypostatic nondeterminate being (ad intra), where an act-potency distinction will not obtain, simply will not, by definition, correspond to temporally modal categories of essential-hypostatic determinate being.

It makes perfect sense, otherwise, to draw on the formal mode of identity to locate the similarities between, on one hand, the determinate effects of the divine energeia (essentially or substantially of ousia) & economy (personally or hypostatically of haecceities), and, on the other, those of created, determinate beings.

Is that not precisely what we find in the Palamitic distinction between essence & energies, Thomist distinction between esse naturale & intentionale, Scotus’ formal distinction and Peirce’s thirdness?

There’s a divine-creaturely nexus, a semiotic locus, where we can reason, abductively, from effects that are proper to no known causes, to putative causes, whether the Actus Purus of nondeterminate & self-determinate divine causes, or the acts in potency of in/determinate creaturely causes, both physical & metaphysical.

While we are often epistemically constrained, methodologically, unable to exhaustively define such putative causes, whether divine, metaphysical or even physical, this moderate realism affords us the prospect of nevertheless, really, making successful references – per a univocal mode of identity vis a vis effects.

That’s what my project has been about — establishing that our God-talk, including a classical trinitology, remains robustly intelligible & coherent:


Note re: leaps of faith


  • nihilism
  • pantheism


  • panen-theism (dipolar or whole-part relation)
  • classical theism (created tehom – staged vs lapsarian)


  • pan-entheism (uncreated tehom)

Classical Theism Doesn’t Really Compete (tautologically)

  • Chance or necessity?
  • Chaos or order?
  • Paradox or pattern?
  • Random or systematic?
  • Asymmetric or symmetric?
  • Discontinuity or continuity?

We approach reality’s in/determinacies with no final analytical adjudication of how many & which of them arise from methodological or epistemic in/determinabilities versus various in-principle occultings of certain in/determined ontic realities.

Some tautologies imagine a wholesale indeterminedness, a thoroughgoing realm of merely ephemeral forms, a tehomic abyss of nominalistic turtles all the way across. Others, a pervasively determined reality of only eternal forms, a pantheon of essentialistic turtles all the way down.

Neither of these monistic tautologies requires mereological whole-part distinctions, although, ontologically, the former type usually admits materialist presuppositions, the latter – idealist. Explanatorily & causally, the former takes reality to be brute, the latter conceives it as ultimately explicable & absolutely caused.

Might there be more than turtles?

Could they be arranged with more than horizontal & vertical directionality, perhaps both? without

  • dichotomizing them into matter or mind, perhaps both?
  • imagining that turtlehood’s at least partly intelligible even if at bottom still wholly incomprehensible?
  • conceiving it as adequately determined & sufficiently reasoned rather than either absolutely so or pervasively indetermined?

What alternative tautology could accommodate that cluster of presuppositions?

None has presented.

Rather than formal, syllogistic arguments that employ root metaphors & metaphysical dichotomies between chance & necessity or advancing pure deductions, humankind has long taken refuge in common sense abductions, informal reasonings that rely heavily on reductiones ad absurdum.

Without root metaphors & exhaustive definitions, instead employing only vague & general phenomenological categories of meta-ontological significance, our reasoning must resort to a fallibilist triadic cycling of abductive hypothesizing, deductive clarifying & inductive testing, which will converge on the truth, even when we can only make successful references to reality.

Classical theism, Thomism, Scotism, Neo-platonism, Palamism, Augustinianism and such do not compete on tautological terms with either a materialist monism or pantheism, either a thoroughgoing nominalism or essentialism, both which take rather naïve a prioristic approaches with a pretense of comprehensively accounting for reality, mereologically, exhaustively defining its objects, epistemologically, neatly arranging its turtles, ontologically.

Rather, distinctions like being, reality & relations; essence, existent, act-potency; quiddity, haecceity, formal distinction; ousia, hypostasis, energeia; and so on, suffice to “meaningfully” relate realities via successful references & abductive inferences, even when successful definitions otherwise elude us.

As Christians encounter paradox, we don’t rush to closure, imagining a priori that it must necessarily be

  • resolved, dialectically in synthesis;
  • dissolved, paradigmatically via perspectival shift;
  • maintained, creatively in tension; or
  • evaded, practically, via reductiones.

Our abductive hypotheses regarding a putative Ens Necessarium tend to evade radically nominalistic & essentialistic tautologies, which devolve into atheological & pantheological stances that wreak conceptual havoc on our

  • common sense experience of a human free will,
  • common sense notions of causality,
  • common sense presuppositions of metaphysical reality & first principles of reasoning.

Our abductions regarding reality’s ultimates & reductiones regarding its proximates don’t a priori recommend themselves as metaphysical verities without having first proved themselves, a posteriori, as indispensable methodological stipulations.

A Dionysian-like approach gets to the point:

  1. God is | x | is true analogically and kataphatically.
  2. God is | not x | is true literally and apophatically.
  3. God’s neither | x | nor | not x | is true unitively.

When we approach classical theisms without this logic, we fall into confusion because we project onto them our own implicit nominalisms & essentialisms and materialisms & idealisms. We imagine we can

  • synthesize them in an Hegelian-like dialectic (like some dipolar theisms),
  • dissolve them paradigmatically through some Kuhnian-like shift (like some panentheisms), or
  • maintain their creative tensions (methodological principle of sufficient reason but a metaphysical materialism).

That’s not what classical theism does!

Instead, it evades such tensions altogether, refrains from proving too much, from saying more than can possibly be known, from telling untellable stories.

Some pejoratively caricature as an ad hoc mysterianism

  • such apophasis,
  • such reliance on successful references,
  • such bracketing of root metaphors,
  • such an inescapably fallibilist approach,
  • such a practical reasoning under speculative uncertainty.

Our defense, though, is robust.

This is no dissolvent mysterianism, but the exuberantly hopeful epistemic optimism of a nuanced, negative mysterianism, which posits that –

  • if our indispensable methodological stipulations derive from timeless metaphysical truths,
  • then, our acting as if these propositions, however tentative, are true,
  • will more likely provide us more beautiful, good, unitive & liberative value-realizations than alternative stances can.

Now, it may well be that, too many of us aren’t always the best exemplars of such transcendental imperatives, piously voicing firm beliefs, while practically responding to life with nihilistic tendencies. Mea maxima culpa!But that’s why we so fulsomely celebrate our hagiographic traditions, taking account of how other persons, once similarly situated and as flawed as us, have nevertheless plumbed the depths of solidarity & scaled the heights of compassion, miraculously so, both in virtue and in visible signs like sanctifications, spectacular healings, unitive realizations & transformative liberations – all that remain otherwise inexplicable, both physically & psychologically.

The practical takeaway is that what can often seem rather meager, propositionally, can still impart enormous significance, dispositionally, normatively justifying an eminently actionable way of living, existentially.

As we reflect on the

  • primal emptiness at the Father’s origination of the Trinity,
  • empty manger of the Advent at the Incarnation,
  • empty tomb of the Resurrection,
  • empty space of the Ascension
  • all now filled with the utter fullness of Pentecost …

Let us hope that, whenever we encounter that much beauty, that much goodness, that much unity & love, that much freedom, the Truth will, more likely than otherwise, at least, be nearby.

The kerygma doesn’t finally lend itself, propositionally & with complete definitions, to a competing tautology. It’s a category error to approach our Creeds, Scriptures & Traditions that way. It accommodates itself, rather, to a practical reasoning under speculative uncertainties, where successful references must suffice, commensurate with the Subjects on both Hands of the Father.

If we open ourselves, dispositionally, follow through, existentially, then our abductive propositional apprehensions will grow ever more comprehensive until our vision is Beatific.

How Gelpi’s Inculturated North American Theology “Graced” my encounter with Eastern Orthodoxy

My old acquaintance (45 years) & fellow yat (New Orleanian), the late Jesuit, Don Gelpi, articulated a normative theology of conversion.

His account integrated

  • Edwards’ aesthetic object (i.e. Christology),
  • Royce’s ethical dynamism &
  • Peirce’s logical semiotic, while reframing
  • Lonergan’s conversions in terms of experience.

Palamas’ energies, Stăniloae’s affirmation of direct contemplative experience & Bulgakov’s created Sophia seemed to me to fit just such a view & so did von Balthasar’s outlook.

This all squares with an account of faith that’s neither arational nor rationalistic, but defensibly & coherently trans-rational.

Many others are running with Gelpi’s account in other fruitful directions. For example, see Mark Grave’s “Gracing Neuroscientific Tendencies of the Embodied Soul,”
__Philosophy and Theology 26 (1):97-129 (2014) __, wherein he models the brain’s biology using the dispositional tendencies of nature—characterized by Jonathan Edwards, C. S. Peirce & the Jesuit philosophical theologian Donald Gelpi.

Also, see my own project, a tehomic pan-semio-entheism, which affirms a creatio ex profundis within mostly classical theistic contours:

In Dialogue with Boyd on Hartshorne & Neville on Divine Freedom

Re: The true role of deduction in metaphysics is not to bring out the content of the initially certain, but to bring out the meaning of tentative descriptions of the metaphysically ultimate in experience so that we shall be better able to judge if they do generally describe this ultimate. <<<

Reminds me of Newman’s illative sense, Polyani’s tacit dimension, Maritain’s connaturality, Fries’ nonintuitive immediate knowledge & Peirce’s abduction.

Boyd succeeds at threading the nominalism-essentialism needle with his affirmation of Jonathan Edwards’ dynamical category of disposition, consistent with Peirce’s category of thirdness, where probabilities mediate between possibilities & actualities.

Hartshorne’s emphasis on beauty resonates with Peirce’s aesthetic primacy, but his doctrine of God seems to deflate God’s self-determinate nature, failing to make a sufficient distinction between a nondeterminate esse naturale & determinate esse intentionale. In the end Hartshorne will fall prey, unnecessarily, to the same peril as the Whiteheadian approach – it’s too nominalistic. Without a PSR, a category of dispositions and a Peircean-like abduction of an Ens Necessarium, he badly misconceives freedom, as Lord Acton might say, in terms of a volitional license to do what one, wholly indeterminately, wants, rather than in terms of the true volitional liberty to do what one — not extrinsically determinately, but — self-determinately must (per one’s esse naturale, which self-realizes freedom precisely in eternally be-ing all that’s true, beautiful, good & unitive).

See my own recent twitter thread re freedom, in/determinacy & telos:

re: We shall, in short, utilize the modification of Hartshorne’s foundational statements, combined with his theistic arguments, to arrive at a view of God which accomplishes what the classical view of God as actus purus accomplished—seeing God as self-sufficient, and thus creation and salvation as acts of grace—while yet avoiding the logical fallacies of the classical view and articulating a view of God which is, like the Process view, in accord with the dynamic categories of modernity. <<<

C’est bon

Re: And finally, while we have defended Hartshorne’s view that aesthetic value is a priori (, we have argued that his correlation of aesthetic intensity with synthesized multiplicity is not necessary ( One can, rather, distinguish between the subjective intensity of an experience, and the expression of that experience: the former admits of an acme point, the latter does not ( <<<

This all sounds consonant, still, with Peirce’s aesthetic primacy, i.e. how it avoids hedonism, and Scotus’ primacy of the will, i.e. how it avoids voluntarism. And, having considered Boyd’s project before, I’m reminded how his aesthetic distinctions between intensity & scope, experience & expression, were consonant with those between esse naturale & intentionale, reminiscent of that old formulation, albeit anthropomorphic, “appropriation of novelty & shedding of monotony.”

Re: This view is somewhat paradoxical in the context of Neville’s own system, for central to his entire ontology is the claim that the events of the world must “reveal” God’s character. See ibid., p. 11, “…God’s moral character is revealed in events….” But clearly, if God is genuinely wholly “indeterminate” ad intra, there can be nothing, literally “no-thing,” to reveal. A determinate revelation presupposes a determinate “something” to be revealed. Neville, however, is consistent in admitting that because God’s character is indeterminate, “the divine character” can be said to be “only as good as experience shows it to be as creator of just this world, and no more.” <<<

Yes, when I appropriated Neville on my own terms, I was not satisfied with a kataphatic predication of indeterminacy, ad intra. I appreciate the sentiment to cast God’s freedom more robustly, i.e. ontologically as well as morally. But I also felt that God ad intra must be predicated apophatically, beyond both in/determinacy & non/existents of being, e.g. no-thing-ness.

Essential propria like freedom would not be justified metaphysically but exegetically from both the gratuity of creation & the gratuity of grace, from both general & special revelation.

So, my taxonomy of determinacies looks like this:

Nondeterminate Emptiness (e.g. ground of Tillich & Neville, Ens Necessarium of Peirce)

Nondeterminate Nothingness (e.g. nihilum, ex nihilo)

Indeterminate Being (e.g. tehom)
• uncreated
• created
• lapsarian

Determinate Being (e.g. probabilistic in/determinacies as variously in/determinable and/or in/determined in degrees; as absolutely and/or relatively self-determinate)

God’s freedom

ad intra predicated

  • apophatically & essentially by a proprium of nondeterminacy,
  • apophatically & hypostatically by an idioma of unoriginacy, then,

ad extra – predicated kataphatically & hypostatically by

  • an idioma of absolute self-determinacy as the sole source of the Trinity
  • the pneumatological & Christological hypostases as relatively self-determinate
  • the Trinity, as Actus Purus, essentially & hypostatically, dynamical, determinable by substantial energies & hypostatical economies via the vestigial realities in the gratuity of creation & theotic realities in gratuity of grace, all as effected by the Trinitological synergy & revealed in special revelation

I recently observed:

It seems to me that many arguments – regarding what precisely was and remains at stake in those tensions still playing out between our patristic, scholastic & modern schools – turn on whether or not we imagine the Fathers & Medievals were mostly trying to solve, on one hand, the One & the Many, or, on the other, the Mystery of Freedom, both divine & creaturely, as all we most deeply cherish derives from its putatively coinherent gratuities, what we celebrate in our lives as Love. I hope I have unpacked enough to hint that such a tension represents a false dichotomy.


Re: God’s being is, in our view, determinate, at least with regard to God’s necessary God-defining characteristics. <<<

I think I suggested above – d’accord.

There are fundamental issues for me in univocally predicating in/determinacy of both God ad intra and creation. Even ad extra, I maintain, above, an apophatic predication of God’s determinacy by negating any coinherence of extrinsic determinacy with God’s self-determinacy. Divine self-determinacy further distinguishes itself as Actus Purus, while creaturely self-determinacy entails formative actualization of telic potencies in a dynamical theotic be-coming.

The question left begging, of course, is the causal nexus of creaturely participation in the divine economy & incorporation into the divine nature. Of course, it must be located

  • in our responses to special revelation,
  • in our responses to all that is true, unitive, beautiful, good & liberative in the vestigia of general revelation,
  • in our responses to our spontaneous abductions of the Ens Necessarium as we muse about effects we encounter as would be proper to no known creaturely causes, specifically vestigial & theotic effects that full body blow us with an excess of meaning, and
  • as those responses erupt in worship, foster conversions, instill a solidarity & unity from which compassion directly ensues in spiritual & corporal works of mercy.

Not to be coy, I imagine the nexus is semiotic.

And, when I tweet such things as I did earlier today —

What’s intrigues me about certain telic realities, including both formal & final causes, is that they can be lurking in such incredibly latent, implicate, tacit & unobtrusive ways, while, at the same time, so ineluctably & utterly efficacious. —

I very much have in mind both created & Uncreated grace, sacraments & symbols, vestigial & theotic signs.

My meta-ontological categorizing does not need a specific metaphysic but I intend it to be normative for any approach, whether creatio ex nihilo, amore or profundis, whether classical, neo-classical or process. And I do think panentheism & creatio ex profundis can be consistently conceived within rather classical contours. I first outlined same in a prologue to my project called pan-semio-entheism:

As for the Trinity, I think I subscribe to a negative mysterianism, combined with an ananoetic approach that serves only as an exploratory heuristic device & not as an explanatory model. This heuristic locates trinitarian unity substantially in one ousia; hypostatically in one source, the Father, as principium; dynamically, in the Trinity, as synergy.

I’m not a priori suggesting there’s no ontological root metaphor that could be had in principle, but am dang sure observing that I’ve never see a sufficient one in practice.


Re: link between a diversified harmony and the intensity of an aesthetic experience is not necessarily proportional


Re: view of God wherein the self-sufficient actuality of God could be conceived of as necessary, while yet allowing for a contingent “expressive” actual aspect to God’s being


Re: And the benevolence of the Trinity consists in the fact that God appreciates, and eternally remembers, the goodness acquired in the world along this journey, transforming it in a way that “feeds back into the world” to further its progress.

My own sophianic vision!

Where in the World is Sophia? —a Sophiological footnote

The created grace Gelpi refers to would be constituted by reality’s actualized potencies, eternalized teloi (both temporal & ultimate teloi) of Peircean thirdness, efficient materialities of secondness, connaturalized indeterminacies of firstness, existentialized essences, formalized finalities, participatory intimacizations eternalized, all temporal realities coaxed forth Pneumatologically, Christologically & Paterologically via Divine Energies as would account for effects as would be proper to no known causes.

Every trace of human goodness, for example, eternalized; along with every beginning of a smile & all wholesome trivialities.

Whether interpreted in Platonic, Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, Thomist, Scotist, Palamitic or Peircean categories — (and I cross hermeneutical bridges between them all: ), — collectively & dynamically, these cumulative actualized potencies or eternally realized divine teloi may represent Sophia, who participates in the Divine Energies in a perichoretic
Divine Dance.

In The Wisdom of God, Bulgakov spoke of two Sophias, one created and the other uncreated. She to whom I refer above would be the created Sophia in her participatedness. While I affirm the Divine Energies per a quasi- or trans-formal distinction, I must defer to others regarding the manner of viewing Sophia in
Orthodoxy. And still wonder just how we might best account for ecstatic visions of Sophia.

Re: Hence, God enjoys the world—the world “means something” to God—not as an essential element in God’s necessary self-constitution, but as an expression of God’s self-constitution. The world provides a new occasion for the unsurpassable beauty of God, defined in terms of divine intensity, to be expressed and in a sense “repeated” in a novel form. <<<

Important & defensible, again w/esse naturale vs intentionale distinction.

Re: dispositionality

Peircean Thirdness, the category of telic realities, formal acts in various degrees of final potencies, the loci of semiotic symbols, nexus of the divine & human, the dispositional, Christological & pneumatological.

Tom Belt, I can see why Robinson & Southgate appealed to you. You must’ve well intuited that you & Boyd (erstwhile?) would capture my imagination.