Both Duns Scotus & Maximus the Confessor sufficiently nuance their notions of the will in ways that sufficiently navigate past both voluntarist & intellectualist flaws.
The following strategies are influenced by but not developed solely from Scotistic & Maximian approaches.
relocate primary causation (as an immediate, continuously conserving cause) to the act of existence, which is in limited potency to an essential cause
recognize that secondary causality includes realities that vary in degrees of indeterminacy
relocate the will from a formal to an efficient causal act, which is in limited potency to a material cause
relocate the operation of grace from an efficient to a formal cause, which is in limited potency to a final cause
distinguish will (self-determination) from nature (hetero-determination)
distinguish an “assent to,” a “refusal of” & an “absence of refusal of” grace (as one can cease to refuse grace without assenting to it)
distinguish three logoi of being, well-being, and eternal being, God the sole cause of the first & third, while well-being’s intermediately caused by our sponaneous movement & gnomic willing (epistemic & axiological distancing), hence, intellect’s necessarily operative but not wholly determinative in volition
attribute gnomic will to evolution not a “fall”
distinguish freedoms to assent, refuse or permit (absence of refusal)
freedom from – an indeterminate willing w/o ratio (choosing among goods, including one’s choosing whether to will at all) from
freedom to – a determinate willing w/ratio (fallibly choosing between goods, per one’s constitutive desires & needs, and privations, iow, refusing grace) and
freedom for – a self-determined or self-limited willing (as in kenosis)
Chapter 4, Duns Scotus on Freedom as a Pure Perfection – Necessity & Contingency by Gonzalez-Ayesta in
Margaret Cameron ed., Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 2, Routledge, Jul 6, 2018
Divine Freedom & Necessity (analogues & antinomies)
no best possible worlds but a pareto front of equipoised optimalities, choosing among the perfectly good – jssylvest
Brandon Gallaher shows that the classical Christian understanding of God having a non-necessary relationship to the world and divine freedom being a sheer assertion of God’s will must be completely rethought.
One can find further resources regarding Scotistic & Maximian libertarian conceptions of the will within these notes, above, especially by searching for Mary Beth Ingham, Marilyn McCord Adams & Eleonore Stump.