Of the three Abelardian divine modes of identity, it is the formal mode from which an Aristotelian syllogistic can be derived to thus define the identities of creatures formally (and not inconsistent with the irreducibly triadic modal ontology of Peirce’s methodological & semantic pragmatisms).
In neither divine nor creaturely formal modes of identity would a person ever be considered constituted as an hypostasis bereft of an essential nature, as if the essential whatness of persons did not necessarily inhere along with the hownesses of each whoness.
Neither would a secondary personal nature ever not necessarily inhere along with both the whoness, hence peculiar howness, of a person’s hypostatic nature and the whatness of their essential nature.
Natures, both as hypostatic whonesses & hownesses as well as both essential & secondary whatnesses, are only ever, i.e. eternally, enhypostasized. The concept of an anhypostatic nature does not successfully refer.
Not only should we neither reify (anhypostasize) the essence nor hypostasize the energeia, but – we shouldn’t reduce the persons to mere idiomata.
To that extent, then, any temporal distribution of logoi will necessarily be – not only an emanation of formal whatnesses, but – a procession of hypostatic hownesses.
Creation, then, processively enhypostasizes the created natures – hypostatic, essential & secondary – through, with & in the Logos as eternally incarnated (enhypostasized or assumed) by Him.
This would be consistent with my panSEMIOentheism which affirms both an ontological pan-entheism of a creatio ex nihilo & a mereological panen-theism of a creatio ex deo, wherein the hypostatic & essential natures of every freely willing creature have been eternally determined, called forth ex nihilo, and invited to co-creatively self-determine their secondary natures, beckoned forth ex Deo.
Per ipsum, et cum ipso, et in ipso, est tibi Deo Patri omnipotenti in unitate Spiritus Sancti, omnis honor et gloria per omnia saecula saeculorum.