The creatio ex nihilo & analogy of being remain necessary but insufficient without creatio ex Deo & hypostatic identities

The paterological uniqueness (protological) of the monarchy culminates in the sophianic union (eschatological)

not only per our co-creative formal acts, which participate imitatively in the creative (ex nihilo) essential unicity, but –

per our co-creative existential & efficient acts, which participate substratively in the emanational (ex Deo) hypostatic unity,

all manifested by the unitary energeia.

My principle of retreblement triadically integrates: entities, relations & essences; existential, efficient & formal acts, etc.

Per Olivier-Maurice Clément‘s trinitarian anthropol­ogy

man [born in the divinity as God is born in the humanity] is called, to use the expressions of Soloviev, to extend the God-man in a creative way into the ‘God-manhood’, the ‘God-universe’.

Classical theism, approached in terms of an analogy of being, then supplemented by 

pan-entheistic accounts of analogous mutual indwellings, per creatio ex nihilo,

solves two of the classical “problems of beginning” – infinite regression & circular referentiality.

To address the problem of causal disjunction, it must be further supplemented by a mereological panen-theistic account of hypostatic identities per creatio ex Deo.

While this unavoidably leaves residual problems of beginning, like those of question begging & tautology, the account, nevertheless, thereby enjoys an epistemic parity with all competing stances (including nihilisms).

Faced with the choice between inconsistency & incompleteness, the good money has always bet on being consistent (per Stephen Hawking).

Note:

I will share an excerpt from Dong-Sik Park’s 2012 dissertation, “The God-World Relationship Between Joseph Bracken, Philip Clayton, and the Open Theism,” and offer some comments, after.

With regard to freedom, Schelling explains it in the relation between individual and whole, saying that although an individual part is only possible within the whole of an organism, it has its own life or freedom for itself. In the relation between God and the world, the procession [Folge] of things from God is God’s self-revelation and God can only reveal himself to himself in free beings acting on their own, because there is no
ground other than God. That is, whereas only what is free is in God because it is free,
what is not free is necessarily outside of God because it is not free. In the sense, Schelling asserts that “The beginning and ending of this philosophy is freedom.” The freedom of the creatures is not dependent on divine choice, since the divine life essentially transacts with free creatures. As Berdyaev argues, freedom as such is not created, but rather is “a primordial principle of reality inherent in deity as such and in all concrete actualities. Thus the freedom of the creatures is against a false conception of divine omnipotence which suppresses or manipulates the freedom. Every kind of life is “a succession and concatenation of states,” since each previous state is the ground which bears potency of the succeeding state. This movement is even in the divine life.

My comments:

We must go beyond the creatio ex nihilo elements that implicate, for example, both an analogy of being, essentially, & synergy of energeia, relationally, to better account for the participatory dynamics of divine-creaturely agential interactivity.

The Logos-logoi identity introduces the creatio ex Deo elements that necessarily implicate, in my view, a mereology of hypostases.

This is not to introduce a robustly metaphysical root metaphor (e.g. an Aurobindian mereological panen-theism), but only a vague, perichoretic-like, meta-heuristic, (e.g. Bracken’s Divine Matrix), which respects the apophatic theo-anthropological contours that are required to properly honor the radically mysterious depths of every person, whose individuation derives from an irreducibly unique haecceity-like idioma.