Not thru Ontological Middling but thru Teleological Muddling do Sophia, Energies & Logoi Operate in a Neo-Chalcedonian Cosmotheandrism

Sophia has been a challenge to map as revealed in historical treatments. Setting those descriptive accounts to the side, at least in part, below is my own normative formulation.

I like to conceive Sophia as an

attribute of the divine essence, belonging to the Trinity,

exemplified hypostatically by the Son as wisdom & Spirit as glory, &

manifested as uncreated Sophia thru such as divine energies (Palamite) & logoi (Maximian).

These uncreated logoi are manifested theophanically, as they terminate in effects on determinate being (as created logoi) in manifold & multiform participable ways, e.g. teloi, laws, nomicities, gifts, grace, signs & wonders.

Every creaturely cooperation with, hence participation in, the logoi constitutes a theotic, sophianic eternalization that incorporates us into created Sophia, Christ’s Bride or Mystical Body.

Thus we imitate the Bridal Fiat of the Theotokos & thereby participate in her incarnational synergism as it’s both eschatologically consummated in the divine nuptial union & protologically anticipated by  (contained in) the pre-existent logoi of Christ.

Creation happens.

To Be or Not, to Sophianize or Not our human secondary nature: The Unbearable Lightness of Being (eternally self-determined)

Divine Modes of Identity – Bulgakov, Balthasar & Bracken with Scotus & the Greek Fathers

Retreblement – a Systematic Apocatastasis & Pneumatological Missiology per a Neo-Chalcedonian Cosmotheandrism

Creativity would be the nature of God, pattern of existence & activity proper to God that God shares in varying degrees w/finite entities in an expression of divine empowering love. ~ Bracken

Thus I re-situate Bulgakov’s sophiology, Maximus’ Logos-logoi & Palamas’ energies.

re: use of Whitehead’s cosmology for Christian understanding of the God- world relationship risks misinterpretation of ANW: In my judgment, Aquinas made basically the same “mistake” in employing Aristotelian metaphysics to set forth his understanding in the ST. ~ Joe Bracken

Bulgakov claims Aquinas’s account is insufficiently Trinitarian, too influenced by pagan philosophy, & separates the divine will & intellect in such a way as to introduce arbitrariness into the relationship between the divine ideas & creation. ~ John Hughes

Here I am not endorsing the controversial thesis of creatio ex nihilo advocated by Irenaeus and others over the centuries, but instead proposing the notion of creatio ex deo. ~ Joseph Bracken

Bulgakov understood the doctrine of creation to be negatively defined as creatio ex nihilo and positively defined as creatio ex Deo. ~ Pavel L. Gavriljuk

Christian systematic theologians until quite recently grossly overemphasized the role of divine power and thereby significantly underestimated the role of divine love in their understanding of how God deals with the creatures of this world. ~ Joseph Bracken

For God to be the transcendent source of creativity within the cosmic process, God must be ontologically both the primordial source and ultimate goal of the cosmic process. ~ Joseph Bracken

A New Process-Oriented Approach to Theodicy Joseph Bracken, Process Studies, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 2019), pp.105-120 https://jstor.org/stable/10.5406/processstudies.48.1.0105#metadata_info_tab_contents

The Problem of Pantheism in the Sophiology of Sergii Bulgakov: A Panentheistic Solution in the Process Trinitarianism of Joseph Bracken? by Brandon Gallaher

This essay explores Bulgakov’s thought as an alternative form of panentheism to Bracken’s

‘The Problem of Pantheism in the Sophiology of Sergii Bulgakov: A Panentheistic Solution in the…academia.edu

The God-World Relationship Between Joseph Bracken, Philip Clayton, and the Open Theism, by Dong-Sik Park, Claremont Graduate University

The God-World Relationship Between Joseph Bracken, Philip Clayton, and the Open Theismscholarship.claremont.edu

In Whom We Live & Move & Have Our Being, Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004 Below, I will list several chapters of this book, above, as are relevant to energies, logoi & sophia in a panentheism.

a) God immanent yet transcendent : the divine energies according to Saint Gregory Palamas, Kallistos Ware

b) The universe as hypostatic inherence in the logos of God : panentheism in the eastern orthodox perspective, Alexei V. Nesteruk

c) The cosmic vision of Saint Maximos the Confessor, Andrew Louth

d) Panentheism : a field-oriented approach, Joseph A. Bracken

e) The logos as wisdom : a starting point for a Sophianc theology of creation, Celia E. Deane-Drummond

Bulgakov’s Account of Creation: Neglected Aspects, Critics and Contemporary Relevance, Pavel L. Gavriljuk, International journal of systematic theology, 2015, Volume: 17, Issue: 4, Pages: 450-463

Creatio ex nihilo and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas: How fair is Bulgakov’s critique?, John Hughes, Modern Theology, Volume 29, Issue 2, 2013

“Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and, however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap” ~ Whitehead, Process and Reality

Implicit here is my long- standing conviction that every metaphysical system is inevitably provisional and thus in principle open to reform and revision. ~ Joseph Bracken

Notes regarding Divine-Human Interaction & Grace per Libertarian Free Will

My account, below, will not exhaust every manner of divine-human interaction & of grace, but will address one aspect that I find deeply consoling — that God infuses grace universally, superabundantly & even without our assent, ever respecting our libertarian free will.

In reconciling divine-human interactions via grace & libertarian freedom of the will, might we draw on diverse conceptions from Scotism, Neoplatonism & Thomism (analytical not Banezian)?

We could conceive of both Scotus & Maximus as libertarians for whom the intellect’s necessarily operative but not wholly determinative in volition, where self-determinative volitional acts remain limited in potency to the logoi of being, well-being & eternal being.

The divine & human wills are thus not connected by one’s choosing between “this or that” but in “why the will wills at all,” as it does remain free not to act (via a type of quiescence). Such a volition would entail a moderately libertarian & moderately voluntarist free will.

Scotus locates the will in efficient causation. For many, this represents a conceptual relocation from the formal.

Interestingly, this can be squared with Eleonore Stump’s relocation of the operation of grace from efficient to formal causality over against Banezian premotion.

Stump distinguishes between an “assent to,” a “refusal of” & an “absence of refusal of” grace, as, per Aquinas, one can cease to refuse grace without assenting to it.

God thus infuses grace in us all, even when we don’t assent, as long as we’re not refusing it, i.e. as long as our wills are “quiescent.”

Thereby He infuses the good will of our justifying faith.

Thereby we can abandon ourselves to Divine Providence through quiescence.

Thus, let us pray –

w/Ignatius: “Take, Lord, receive all my liberty.”

w/the Psalmist: “Be still & know that I am God.”

with Merton: “I know you will lead me by the right road though I may know nothing about it.”

May we both cooperate with the graces of today & be alert to divine infusions.

Divine Freedom & Necessity in a Cosmotheandrism

For Bulgakov: I”s are constituted by “Thou”s

In the semiotic approach to emergence, Terry Deacon has coined two terms:

1) an “ententional” phenomenon is characterized by

2) a specific reality that it lacks, i.e. an “absential

Those terms, for me, bring to mind what I would call “embodied antinomies” or dynamical ententional-absential aboutnesses.

If epistemology models ontology, then, not every mediation need dialectically express some accommodative middle, whether epistemologically &/or ontologically.

Rather, because some of reality’s deepest value-realizations are precisely generated by the antinomial embodiments of ententional phenomena in ontologically creative tensions with their absentials (i.e. via epistemic & axiological distancing), our languages can semiotically express such dynamics only through such non-accommodative mediations, as would nurture a healthy aporetic sense.

We might say, for example, that ententional “I”s are constituted by absential “Thou”s.

And we might even observe that certain forms of “freedom” are constituted by “necessity.”

We could even say that, we, as creatures, exist as absential “thou”s for the necessarily freely willing loving God, the supremely ententional “I am.”

Such a divine ententionality depends essentially on a supremely personal divine intentionality per a divine volition that’s, at once, in some sense groundless as well as grounded by a self-constituting love, beyond all of our meager voluntarist or libertarian conceptions.

What might the Trinity’s economic generation of our own antinomial embodiments, our own radically social natures, our own human ententional phenomena (logoi) & absentials (tropoi), reveal “about” the ad intra Trinitarian generations & taxis?

The economic can, in principle, reveal nothing ontologically quidditative about the immanent Trinity (ad intra aporia).

Semiotically, however, because the divine energies do, at once, connotatively signify the essence & denotatively indicate the hypostases, from the unitary nature of the divine energies, while epistemically constrained by sophianic aporia (e.g. un/created, in/determinate, non/necessitating, causal logoi & teloi?), we can nevertheless connotatively infer the ultimate unicity of the divine ousia, even though constrained by essential aporia (e.g. indivisible yet communicable?), and denotatively infer the unitive relations of the divine hypostases, i.e. Monarchy of the Father & divine taxis, although constrained by hypostatic aporia (e.g. how & which metaphysical idiomata are modeled by our epistemic gnorismata?).

Because human symbolic inference is irreducibly triadic, interpretively, it’s also inherently performative, which means such connotative & denotative inferences, above, flow from our efficacious participations in the divine logoi, i.e. concretely & experientially, hence, sacramentally. Only then can our participatory imaginations, next, lend themselves to the post-experiential abstractions & discursive formulations of our Eucharistic anamnesis.

So, this creation’s not born of any necessity as would in any measure negate the eternal freedoms (both with & without ratio, i.e. both groundless & of a self-constituted ground, e.g. love) of nondeterminate divine being. Rather, it would ensue from the radically free, kenotic self-limitation of the self-determined divine being.

The Logos thus freely & donatively gifts participable logoi.
And not just per those bilateral theandric logoi as are proportionally (asymmetrically) participated in via incarnational humanization & theotic divinization, such as when we live as we pray – Biblically, creedally & liturgically. The entire creation participates, cosmically, proportional to other ententional aboutnesses or teloi – all as existentially oriented in an emergent hierarchy of nested absentials:
• veldo-poietic (field-like) entities present as teleopotent or end-unbounded;
• cosmopoietic – teleomatic or end-stated;
• biopoietic – teleonomic or end-directed or end-coded;
• sentiopoietic – teleoqualic or end-purposed; and
• sapiopoietic – teleologic or end-intended.

As such, this account approaches being, apophatically, as radically discontinuous ontologically, with an aporetic approach to nondeterminate, self-determinate, indeterminate & determinate entities, which exhibit characteristic aboutnesses via manifold & multiform antinomial embodiments.

Kataphatically, reality’s cosmotheandric hierarchy of ententional-absential participations via the Maximian Logos-logoi identity affords us a profound degree of existential actionability as we proportionally imitate the Christ, analogically & ontologically – each per her unique embodied tropoi, and literally & teleologically – all via participation in identical logoi.

Antinomial embodiments thus constitutively relates all being, whether nondeterminate, self -determinate & in/determinate, in dynamical terms of essential unicity, hypostatic unity & unitary energeia.

The protological (paterology, christology & pneumatological) thus constitutes – not only the eschatological, but – the ecclesiological, soteriological, sacramental & sophiological.

See: https://sylvestjohn.org/2017/12/13/contemplative-being-behaving-believing-belonging-desiring-becoming-an-outline-of-foundations/

Liturgically, then, after our meditation on the Word, the Logos, through our Offertory, our own ecstasis & proodos of self-transcendence, we’ll enjoy Communion, our enstasis & mone in union, to then go forth empowered to love & serve via our Post Communion epecstasis & epistrophe or self-reception.

Notes regarding different forms of volition:

indetermined w/o ratio or with freedom from necessity, including one’s choosing whether to will at all, moderately voluntarist

in/determined w/ratio (desires or needs) or freedom to – assent, refuse or permit (absence of refusal), moderately libertarian

self-determined or self-limited or freedom for, as in kenosis, authentically sacrificial

These are imagoes Dei of the Divine Volition which is nondeterminate (both w/ & w/o ratio) & self-determinate via ad intra ur-kenosis & ad extra kenosis.

Neo-Chalcedonianism is Uncommonly Commonsensical

Cyril & Maximus ambitioned nothing robustly explanatory. Instead, they much more modestly established Christological grounds, which remain fertile for cultivating new meanings of the Incarnation, today. In our Trinitology & Christology, we can take a commonsensical approach to understanding the divine persons. We can fruitfully employ vague & general exploratory heuristics, using grammatical semantic references, in our ongoing probes of the meaning of our encounters of these persons in scripture & liturgy.

We similarly probe the meanings of methexis & theosis. Terms referring to essential propria, hypostatic idiomata & relational energeia & logoi, in principle, can’t be considered constitutive ontological definitions suitable for use in analytical, explanatory metaphysics.

The question of meaning put to us was – not WHAT, but – WHO do you say I am?

As we recognize & affirm the protological in the eschatological & vice versa, this needn’t entail a thoroughgoing theological determinism, not even for a universalist stance, at least, not if we properly distinguish & nuance determination, causation, necessitation & freedom.

Proportional participations in Maximian logoi, beyond being theandric realities, express universal cosmic realities?

This evokes for me Bulgakov’s seeing divine beauty in nature, God as indifferentia oppositorum & his embrace of Nicholas of Cusa’s coincidentia oppositorum.

Not thru an ontological “middling” but via a teleological “muddling” of antinomial realities do sophia, energeia & logoi reveal the unitary nature of the divine energies, ultimate unicity of the divine ousia & unitive relations of the divine hypostases.

Peirce’s semiotic realism well navigates past the existentially perilous shoals of an empty nominalism, vulgar pragmatism, idealist anti-realism, arbitrary voluntarism & corrosive relativism.

Insofar as life’s inescapably liturgical, we might more parsimoniously refer to that creedal collection of negations as the Litany of Nihilism.

To the extent that our creeds are inherently orthopraxic, we must all be on our guard to not celebrate this Litany of Nihilism, i.e. unawares & in the very manners that we move and live and have our being.

This is to observe that we all need to be more vigilant, as we will all on occasion entertain angels, unawares, and they best not be Screwtape or Wormwood.

While Peirce’s abduction of the reality of God does barely sneak by a naive fideism, any refusal to journey beyond his Ens Necessarium would implicitly entail a radically apophatic deism.

So, in the same way that Peirce went beyond both Scotism & German Idealism, influenced by & appropriating their best intuitions, setting aside any inadequacies, I’ve found a most profitable way to go beyond (not contrary to) Peirce is by turning to Булга́ков & Флоре́нский.

Of the Actus Purus, we may semantically predicate though not ontologically define essential, personal & energetic distinctions like being, willing & doing. If we attentively, concretely & experientially behold the Trinity’s universalized & particularized presences among & donative presents for us, we’ll be overwhelmed by the mysterium tremendum et fascinans. In our post-experiential processing, as our participatory imaginations yield to a cognitive map-making of discursive reasoning, an ineluctable antinomial residue will inevitably remain.

Our numinous experiences do not dialectically resolve the dynamical tensions that resist our fallible reasoning. We don’t know what to make of essences, persons & energies, which present, at once, groundless, grounded & self-grounded vis a vis our meager conceptions of necessity, freedom & kenosis. And this involves no mere Gödelian trade-off of consistent axioms for systematic incompleteness, such as we employ for determinate being. Rather, we’re confronted by an horizon where our logic’s unavoidably paraconsistent, at best, our systematics remain semi-formal, at best, the nature of our language, itself, antinomial, at best, our notions of identity alternately absolute, relative or nonstrict, at best.

But, wait!

For philosophers, who’ve paid any attention at all to the intractable aporia confronting our accounts regarding the origins of the quantum, of the cosmos, of life, of consciousness & of language, the above-listed epistemic constraints & antinomial residues yet pertain no less to the essences, persons & energies of determinate beings than they do to their divine analogates?

Just as with our failed theodicies, what will finally rescue our rationalistic theologies, will not be sylly syllogisms. What will finally satisfy our insatiable appetite for Goodness beyond all goodness, our admirable quest for Beauty beyond all beauty, our insatiable longing for Unity beyond all unity, our transformative realization of a Freedom beyond all freedom, need not require the elimination of reality’s antinomial residues but, instead, may be divinely provisioned by a ceremonial rescue of being by Being, itself, Who loves us with the same ur-kenotic Love of Our Father, Who eternally generates our Saviour & Advocate, the Son & Spirit. Having thus tasted & seen the Goodness of the Lord, we might even lose interest in His antinomies, or, at least, be no more concerned with them than we are with the axioms that ground 2+2=4, for which one would have to proceed halfway through the Principia to grasp their proof? It’ll finally be the participatory encounter with Love that calms our restless hearts.

Any idle curiosity regarding the biographical knowledge ABOUT our Divine Spouse will thus get eclipsed by the experiential knowledge OF Her via Mystical Union in a vision, most beatific.

The concept of ens is everywhere engulfed in antinomies. In fact ens seems to be subject to the most contrary dialectical passions: it is one but also many, necessary but also contingent, infinite & finite, immutable yet mutable … Rosmini

The Litany of Nihilism employs a vulgar pragmatism as a theory of knowledge, but, regarding a theory of truth, is eliminativist. Few journey that way, theoretically, b/c it’s just not sustainably actionable, existentially.

All of us do fall prey to lapsing into a practical nihilism, as we un/consciously opt, in any given moment, at this or that existential disjunction, to live as if there “really” is no truth, beauty, goodness, unity or freedom.

Our belief in Truth is a disposition & decision we make anew, in every moment, b/c, as God sustains our essential natures via creatio continua, as imagoes Dei, we volitionally sustain our virtuous (or vicious) secondary natures per our own co-creative creatio continua.

Whether historically justifiable or not, Bulgakov charitably interpreted Apollinaris as consistent w/Chalcedon. We might return the favor & tweak Bulgakov’s sophiology in doctrinally consistent ways?

Sophia may not be the only idiom but, for me, seems a felicitous one to collectively approach:

a) paterologically, the monarchia as principium of the hypostatic unity;

b) christologically, the eternal hypostatic union, Logos-logoi indentity, created & uncreated logoi;

c) pneumatologically, the eternal universal cosmic-indwelling presence;

d) trinitologically, the ad extra economic dynamics in relation to ad intra immanence;

e) theanthropically, androgyne, feminine & masculine realities;

f) scripturally, divine wisdom;

g) speculatively, antinomial (not dialectical) mediations & the essential unicity; h) eschatologically, the eternal protological ur-kenotic taxis, kenotic creatio continua & theotokos’ incarnational fiat;

i) soteriologically, an aesthetic teleology;

j-1) sacramentally, creaturely imitation & participation, and

j-2) sophiologically, theurgy & theosis – via the divine unitary energeia & logoi (at once humanizing & divinizing);

k) ecclesiologically, the Mystical Bride;

l) mystagogically, cosmotheandric intimacization;

m) theodicially, intertwined ontic & personal evils, as privative realities finally overcome by sacrificial love per

m-1) a primordially liminal, supra-temporal fall or

m-2) sophiology placed in non-nominalistic process theology.

n/ systematically, its anticipation of an open theist approach. In my view, it best be re-situated in a view more sympathetic to classical theist commitments, e.g. Norris Clarke’s personalist Thomism or Joe Bracken’s neo-Whiteheadian divine matrix.

Also see: Paul L. Gavrilyuk (2005). The kenotic theology of Sergius Bulgakov. Scottish Journal of Theology, 58, pp 25

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0036930605001390

Bulgakov’s Sophiological Panentheism’, keynote address at the Fourth Annual Symposium in honor or Fr. Georges Florovsky, ‘Creation and Creaturehood: The Doctrine of Creation in the Patristic Tradition’, Princeton Theological Seminary, 14-15 February 2014

https://www.academia.edu/9802768/_Bulgakov_s_Sophiological_Panentheism_keynote_address_at_the_Fourth_Annual_Symposium_in_honor_or_Fr._Georges_Florovsky_Creation_and_Creaturehood_The_Doctrine_of_Creation_in_the_Patristic_Tradition_Princeton_Theological_Seminary_14-15_February_2014

‘Graced Creatureliness: Ontological Tension in the Uncreated/Created Distinction in the Sophiologies of Solov’ev, Bulgakov and Milbank’, Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 47.1-2 (2006), 163-190.

https://academia.edu/220401/_Graced_Creatureliness_Ontological_Tension_in_the_Uncreated_Created_Distinction_in_the_Sophiologies_of_Solov_ev_Bulgakov_and_Milbank_Logos_A_Journal_of_Eastern_Christian_Studies_47.1-2_2006_163-190

Theology serves as Queen of the Sciences in an axiologically integral relationship to them but doesn’t deny their methodological autonomy. While it’s implicit metaphysica generalis rejects nonoverlapping magisteria, still, its role contributes – not explanatory, but – only heuristic value. And it can thus impart same even for those who receive its metaphysical presuppositions as mere methodological stipulations. As such, it should emulate the epistemic humility of a servant leader, eschewing any triumphalistic hubris. There’s no reason to believe that a robustly fecund theological heuristic can’t fruitfully proceed from a radically inclusivistic pneumatology (rather than imagining its success need require some militantly Christocentric account).

Bulgakov: Science is sophic: this is the answer we can give to skeptical pragmaticism & dogmatic positivism. It is removed from Truth, for it is a child of this world … but it’s also a child of Sophia, the organizing force that leads this world to Truth.

Sophiology, Science And Technology

Moderately Libertarian Approaches to the Will – with Scotistic & Maximian influences

Both Duns Scotus & Maximus the Confessor sufficiently nuance their notions of the will in ways that sufficiently navigate past both voluntarist & intellectualist flaws.

The following strategies are influenced by but not developed solely from Scotistic & Maximian approaches.

relocate primary causation (as an immediate, continuously conserving cause) to the act of existence, which is in limited potency to an essential cause

recognize that secondary causality includes realities that vary in degrees of indeterminacy

relocate the will from a formal to an efficient causal act, which is in limited potency to a material cause

relocate the operation of grace from an efficient to a formal cause, which is in limited potency to a final cause

distinguish will (self-determination) from nature (hetero-determination)

distinguish an “assent to,” a “refusal of” & an “absence of refusal of” grace (as one can cease to refuse grace without assenting to it)

distinguish three logoi of being, well-being, and eternal being, God the sole cause of the first & third, while well-being’s intermediately caused by our sponaneous movement & gnomic willing (epistemic & axiological distancing), hence, intellect’s necessarily operative but not wholly determinative in volition

attribute gnomic will to evolution not a “fall”

distinguish freedoms to assent, refuse or permit (absence of refusal)

distinguish:

freedom from – an indeterminate willing w/o ratio (choosing among goods, including one’s choosing whether to will at all) from

freedom to – a determinate willing w/ratio (fallibly choosing between goods, per one’s constitutive desires & needs, and privations, iow, refusing grace) and

freedom for – a self-determined or self-limited willing (as in kenosis)

Helpful Resources:

The Subtle Doctor and Free Will, Part 1, Maximus Confesses

The Subtle Doctor and Free Will, Part 2, Duns Scotus on Freedom of the Will and Divine Foreknowledge

A paradox in Scotus account of freedom of the will by Gonzalez-Ayesta

Duns Scotus on the Natural Will by C. Gonzalez-Ayesta

Chapter 4, Duns Scotus on Freedom as a Pure Perfection – Necessity & Contingency by Gonzalez-Ayesta in
Margaret Cameron ed., Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 2, Routledge, Jul 6, 2018

St. Maximus the Confessor on the Will—Natural and Gnomic by David Bradshaw, Ph.D.

But the Problem of Free Will by David W. Opderbeck, Ph.D.

Divine Freedom & Necessity (analogues & antinomies)


no best possible worlds but a pareto front of equipoised optimalities, choosing among the perfectly good – jssylvest

Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology, Oxford University Press, 2016

Brandon Gallaher shows that the classical Christian understanding of God having a non-necessary relationship to the world and divine freedom being a sheer assertion of God’s will must be completely rethought.

Review of Brandon Gallaher, Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Reviews in Religion & Theology 24.4 (2017): 697-699–Justin Shaun Coyle.pdf by Justin Shaun Coyle

Retreblement – a Systematic Apocatastasis & Pneumatological Missiology per a Neo-Chalcedonian Cosmotheandrism

One can find further resources regarding Scotistic & Maximian libertarian conceptions of the will within these notes, above, especially by searching for Mary Beth Ingham, Marilyn McCord Adams & Eleonore Stump.

Nature & Grace, Natural & Supernatural, Primary & Secondary Causality, Volitional Aspects With & Without “Ratio

Ordinarily & universally, primary causality operates via existential & formal acts of secondary causation per their essential & final potencies, i.e. in the gratuity of creation or naturally.

Extraordinarily & particularly, primary causality operates – not only via those existential & formal secondary causes, but – via efficient causes, i.e. gratuities of grace & miracles or supernaturally.

Only, per the divine kenotic condescension, grace does not act via the efficient cause of human volition (teleological intention, which includes the proto-rationality* normally designated as w/o ratio). This does not preclude divine activity via other human efficient causes per hierarchically nested (embedded) emergent, ententional (& absential) phenomena (teleoqualic, teleonomic, teleomatic & teleopotent).

*The proto-rationality of connaturality, abductive inference, illative sense, tacit dimensionality, etc apprehends the beauty of universal harmonic orders, both implicate & explicate.

When talking about the divine being or essence, aseity means “not made.” When talking about divine persons or hypostases, aseity has a different meaning – “not from.” All of the persons are “not made,” but only the Father is “not from” God.

To what might such an eternal (not temporal) cause, origin or principle (aitia, arche or principium) refer? Communication. The Father freely & willingly communicates Love, eternally loving (begetting) the Son, loving (spirating) the Holy Spirit & loving (exnihilating) creation.

All persons then participate in the Logoi proportionate to the nature of their being, e. g. God “from” God, “made” by God, hypostatic union, etc
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While neither Maximus nor Scotus viewed the Incarnation as a result of some felix culpa, that conclusion was a response to different questions posed by each. There’s little doubt that they would’ve very much agreed with each other.
Oversimplifying, but – Maximus inquired after the purpose of creation, concluding it was the means toward the end of the Incarnation. Scotus inquired after the purpose of the Incarnation, concluding it was to communicate divine love & Ad majórem Dei glóriam.
When we conceive of divine freedom (e.g. creative) in terms of w/& w/o ratio, as variously ungrounded, constitutively-grounded &/or self-grounded, what’s “constitutively grounded” would refer to – not an essential necessity, but – a volitional inevitability.
All is distant from God, and is remote from Him not by place but by nature— ou tôpo alla physei— as St. John Damascene explains. And this distance is never removed, but is only, as it were, overlapped by immeasurable Divine love. ~ Archpriest Georges Florovsky

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian and Byzantine Writers ~ Bogdan G. Bucur https://academia.edu/4996258/Foreordained_from_All_Eternity_The_Mystery_of_the_Incarnation_According_to_Some_Early_Christian_and_Byzantine_Writers

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian…

academia.edu
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While recognizing that “dance” clearly lacks philological warrant, LaCugna valued dance because of its metaphorical effectiveness. Still, what justifies a metaphor that portrays such a human participation in divine operations?

Well, even if not ad intra trinitarian taxis, certainly the hypostatic union. The perichoretic concept was used in late Patristic Trinitology to convey – not circle dance, but – mutual interpenetration or permeation without merging or mixing (Maximus & the Damascene).
But, such a concept was first employed in early Patristic Christology by the Cappadocians (Nyssen & Nazianzen). While the Trinitarian perichoresis refers to homogenous, consubstantial realities, the Christological refers heterogenously & heterosubstantially.

The practical upshot?
There’s no reason it can’t refer cosmotheandrically!

Beyond Christological perichoresis, the Logos-logoi identity of Maximus further emphasizes how we as creatures participate, albeit proportional to our being, in divinity, for the very same logoi that humanize the divine also divinize the human.

Dance thus remains a great metaphor, even if much of Western theology stumbled upon it accidentally!

cf. Stamatović, Slobodan. (2016). The Meaning of Perichoresis. Open Theology. 2. 10.1515/opth-2016-0026.
#
As w/equivocal uses of God (eg predicate, name), so too re Oneness (eg essential unicity, unitary energeia, hypostatic unity, monarchical uniqueness). Behr’s concern seems to be that MOF most straightforwardly reconciles w/monotheism? Which oneness does monotheism most implicate?
The Capps reconcile with Augustine, Cyril, Aquinas, Scotus, Maximus, Palamas, RC, EO & much of Protestantism on MOF & ousia. Even if for Scotus it’s a primary substance & immanent universal, like TA, it remains communicable but indivisible. Scotus is more felicitous w/Capps is all.

More Notes re Theological Anthropology of this project


Evokes for me the aesthetic teleology of those who employ metaphors fr complexity theory & nonequilibrium thermodynamics, except they say (of dissipative structures): the more complex, the more fragile (due to number of permutations that can be threatened), the more beautiful.

Since the Beautiful beyond all beauty acts eternally as a Simplicity beyond all simplicity with no residues like fragility, those metaphors seem to express an antinomy that’s not mediated ontologically but teleologically, e.g. via the Maximian Logos-logoi
#
The paterological uniqueness of the MOF is not in the least over against the essential unicity, unitary energeia or hypostatic unity. Still, we best get this historical account correct
because the proper reconciliation of monotheism & trinitarianism hangs in the balance. Furthermore, especially for those of us who affirm both the soteriological & theotic significance of the Incarnation, unitarianism, for example, undermines – not just our trinitological
& Christological dogma, but – the practical, hope-filled, dynamical approaches of our participatory anthropology & transfigurative cosmology. So, it’s not sufficient to learn true statements, creedally, or even speculative grammars, heuristically.
#
Scotus is definitely in the “felix culpa or not” camp. It took Maximus to properly extend the implications of the 3C’s further. Going beyond the Cappadocians, Cyril (mia-physite) & Chalcedon, in identifying the Logos’ divine will with the divine logoi, Maximus advanced our understanding of deification, when he recognized it as the corollary of Christ’s humanization. That’s to say that creation was the means toward the end of the Incarnation, which, itself, provides the means toward the end of our deification (& salvation).
#
Another нет (nyet) to Aquinas’ irreversibility thesis & да to Maximian irrevocability! “Scotus is particularly dismissive of the view (held by others besides Thomas) that angels, once they choose, choose irrevocably (ibid. d.7 esp. nn.9–26).
The possibility is expressly left open by Scotus that some angels sinned but repented (ibid. d.6 q.2 n.78).” So, not all medieval speculative angelology supports Feser’s post-mortem anthropology & related infernalistic premises.
I’d continue to insist that “habitus,” whether as one’s virtuous &/or vicious secondary nature, remains always situated between formal acts & final potencies, facilitating or crippling but never “killing” those potentialities, which remain eternally immersed in Divine Logoi.
#
Yes. Scotus holds the keys to any coherent angelology: All finite causes must be together, spatially, to produce an effect. I’d made up a little heuristic to navigate such distinctions but, instead, relied on the term “embodied.” Scotus departs from TA in many regards.
1) in/communicable essence? all essences, divine & creaturely are communicable 2) dis/embodied? all creaturely entities are naturally embodied (communicatability & spatial extendability) 3) in/animate? some entities are animate & some animate entities are agential 4) in/corporeal agents? angels & contingently dis/carnate souls are incorporeal 5) im/material? agential formal causes are immaterial 6) presence spatially located operationally (Aquinas) or per se (Scotus)?
#

When talking about the divine being or essence, aseity means “not made.” When talking about divine persons or hypostases, aseity has a different meaning – “not from.” All of the persons are “not made,” but only the Father is “not from” God.

To what might such an eternal (not temporal) cause, origin or principle (aitia, arche or principium) refer? Communication. The Father freely & willingly communicates Love, eternally loving (begetting) the Son, loving (spirating) the Holy Spirit & loving (exnihilating) creation.

All persons then participate in the Logoi proportionate to the nature of their being, e. g. God “from” God, “made” by God, hypostatic union, etc
#

While neither Maximus nor Scotus viewed the Incarnation as a result of some felix culpa, that conclusion was a response to different questions posed by each. There’s little doubt that they would’ve very much agreed with each other.
Oversimplifying, but – Maximus inquired after the purpose of creation, concluding it was the means toward the end of the Incarnation. Scotus inquired after the purpose of the Incarnation, concluding it was to communicate divine love & Ad majórem Dei glóriam.
When we conceive of divine freedom (e.g. creative) in terms of w/& w/o ratio, as variously ungrounded, constitutively-grounded &/or self-grounded, what’s “constitutively grounded” would refer to – not an essential necessity, but – a volitional inevitability.
All is distant from God, and is remote from Him not by place but by nature— ou tôpo alla physei— as St. John Damascene explains. And this distance is never removed, but is only, as it were, overlapped by immeasurable Divine love. ~ Archpriest Georges Florovsky

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian and Byzantine Writers ~ Bogdan G. Bucur https://academia.edu/4996258/Foreordained_from_All_Eternity_The_Mystery_of_the_Incarnation_According_to_Some_Early_Christian_and_Byzantine_Writers

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian…

academia.edu
#

While recognizing that “dance” clearly lacks philological warrant, LaCugna valued dance because of its metaphorical effectiveness. Still, what justifies a metaphor that portrays such a human participation in divine operations?
Well, even if not ad intra trinitarian taxis, certainly the hypostatic union. The perichoretic concept was used in late Patristic Trinitology to convey – not circle dance, but – mutual interpenetration or permeation without merging or mixing (Maximus & the Damascene).
But, such a concept was first employed in early Patristic Christology by the Cappadocians (Nyssen & Nazianzen). While the Trinitarian perichoresis refers to homogenous, consubstantial realities, the Christological refers heterogenously & heterosubstantially.
The practical upshot?
There’s no reason it can’t refer cosmotheandrically!
Beyond Christological perichoresis, the Logos-logoi identity of Maximus further emphasizes how we as creatures participate, albeit proportional to our being, in divinity, for the very same logoi that humanize the divine also divinize the human.
Dance thus remains a great metaphor, even if much of Western theology stumbled upon it accidentally!
cf. Stamatović, Slobodan. (2016). The Meaning of Perichoresis. Open Theology. 2. 10.1515/opth-2016-0026.
#
As w/equivocal uses of God (eg predicate, name), so too re Oneness (eg essential unicity, unitary energeia, hypostatic unity, monarchical uniqueness). Behr’s concern seems to be that MOF most straightforwardly reconciles w/monotheism? Which oneness does monotheism most implicate?
The Capps reconcile with Augustine, Cyril, Aquinas, Scotus, Maximus, Palamas, RC, EO & much of Protestantism on MOF & ousia. Even if for Scotus it’s a primary substance & immanent universal, like TA, it remains communicable but indivisible. Scotus is more felicitous w/Capps is all.
#
Evokes for me the aesthetic teleology of those who employ metaphors fr complexity theory & nonequilibrium thermodynamics, except they say (of dissipative structures): the more complex, the more fragile (due to number of permutations that can be threatened), the more beautiful.

Since the Beautiful beyond all beauty acts eternally as a Simplicity beyond all simplicity with no residues like fragility, those metaphors seem to express an antinomy that’s not mediated ontologically but teleologically, e.g. via the Maximian Logos-logoi
#
The paterological uniqueness of the MOF is not in the least over against the essential unicity, unitary energeia or hypostatic unity. Still, we best get this historical account correct
because the proper reconciliation of monotheism & trinitarianism hangs in the balance. Furthermore, especially for those of us who affirm both the soteriological & theotic significance of the Incarnation, unitarianism, for example, undermines – not just our trinitological
& Christological dogma, but – the practical, hope-filled, dynamical approaches of our participatory anthropology & transfigurative cosmology. So, it’s not sufficient to learn true statements, creedally, or even speculative grammars, heuristically.
#
Scotus is definitely in the “felix culpa or not” camp. It took Maximus to properly extend the implications of the 3C’s further. Going beyond the Cappadocians, Cyril (mia-physite) & Chalcedon, in identifying the Logos’ divine will with the divine logoi, Maximus advanced our understanding of deification, when he recognized it as the corollary of Christ’s humanization. That’s to say that creation was the means toward the end of the Incarnation, which, itself, provides the means toward the end of our deification (& salvation).
#
Another нет (nyet) to Aquinas’ irreversibility thesis & да to Maximian irrevocability! “Scotus is particularly dismissive of the view (held by others besides Thomas) that angels, once they choose, choose irrevocably (ibid. d.7 esp. nn.9–26).
The possibility is expressly left open by Scotus that some angels sinned but repented (ibid. d.6 q.2 n.78).” So, not all medieval speculative angelology supports Feser’s post-mortem anthropology & related infernalistic premises.
I’d continue to insist that “habitus,” whether as one’s virtuous &/or vicious secondary nature, remains always situated between formal acts & final potencies, facilitating or crippling but never “killing” those potentialities, which remain eternally immersed in Divine Logoi.
#
Yes. Scotus holds the keys to any coherent angelology: All finite causes must be together, spatially, to produce an effect. I’d made up a little heuristic to navigate such distinctions but, instead, relied on the term “embodied.” Scotus departs from TA in many regards.
1) in/communicable essence? all essences, divine & creaturely are communicable 2) dis/embodied? all creaturely entities are naturally embodied (communicatability & spatial extendability) 3) in/animate? some entities are animate & some animate entities are agential 4) in/corporeal agents? angels & contingently dis/carnate souls are incorporeal 5) im/material? agential formal causes are immaterial 6) presence spatially located operationally (Aquinas) or per se (Scotus)?
#

How might our experience of God serve as an authoritative source of theology? Peter Neumann employs the Wesleyan Quadrilateral to engage the projects of 3 contemporary Pentecostal theologians: D. Macchia, Simon K.H. Chan & Amos Yong …
placing them in dialogue w/Catholic, Orthodox & Protestant streams: Congar, E Johnson & D Gelpi; Lossky & Bulgakov; & Moltmann, J Cone & Jenson. Pentecostal Experience: An Ecumenical Encounter, Pickwick Publications 2012 I resonate most w/ Yong, Gelpi, Bulgakov & Moltmann.
Yong echoes the “warning of Robert Jenson that the tension in pneumatology between the particularity of the Spirit in Jesus & in the Church & the universality of the Spirit as a cosmic reality ‘strains Western intellectual tradition to breaking . . .

To identify in other religious traditions elements of grace capable of sustaining the positive response of their members to God’s invitation is much more difficult. It requires a discernment for which criteria have to be established. ~ Giovanni Cereti http://vatican.va/jubilee_2000/magazine/documents/ju_mag_01091997_p-56_en.html

cf Discerning the Spirit in World Religions: The Search for Criteria by Benno van den Toren in The Spirit Is Moving: New Pathways in Pneumatology, Studies in Reformed Theology, V 38 pp 215–231, Ed: Gijsbert van den Brink, Eveline van Staalduine-Sulman & Maarten Wisse

cf KirsteenKim, The Holy Spirit in the world: a global conversation

The Holy Spirit in the world: a global conversation

Because experiential discernment criteria (Kirsteen Kim) will have ecclesial (confess Jesus is Lord), ethical (fruits), charismatic (gifts) & liberational aspects , we have to go beyond a mere hierarchical episcopal magisterium (vis a vis Scripture & tradition)

to include other magisteria. Theologians, laity, the poor & marginalized & believers of non-Christian religions must also be considered to achieve authoritative teaching (Peter Phan). I would add criteria related to a growth in intimacy, i.e. devotional, theotic, etc

As we go forward to better establish pneumatological discernment criteria in a global context – not just theistic, but – Christic criteria remain essential, because Christ remains – not just our norm, but – our Goal.
#
If not for a healthy aporetic sense, paraconsistent logic, dialethism, antinomism, semiformal systems, gödelian axiomatic constraints, our speculative approaches to quantum, cosmic, life, sentience & language origins would explode. The Trinity? Got a sylly syllogism for that!
#

The Capps reconcile with Augustine, Cyril, Aquinas, Scotus, Maximus, Palamas, RC, EO & much of Protestantism on MOF & ousia. Even if for Scotus it’s a primary substance & immanent universal, like TA, it remains communicable but indivisible. Scotus more felicitous w/Capps is all. As w/equivocal uses of God (eg predicate, name), so too re Oneness (eg essential unicity, unitary energeia, hypostatic unity, monarchical uniqueness). Behr’s concern seems to be that MOF most straightforwardly reconciles w/monotheism? Which oneness does monotheism most implicate?
#
Evokes for me the aesthetic teleology of those who employ metaphors fr complexity theory & nonequilibrium thermodynamics, except they say (of dissipative structures): the more complex, the more fragile (due to number of permutations that can be threatened), the more beautifulSince the Beautiful beyond all beauty acts eternally as a Simplicity beyond all simplicity with no residues like fragility, those metaphors seem to express an antinomy that’s not mediated ontologically but teleologically, e.g. via the Maximian Logos-logoi identity?

#
The paterological uniqueness of the MOF is not in the least over against the essential unicity, unitary energeia or hypostatic unity. Still, we best get this historical account correct
because the proper reconciliation of monotheism & trinitarianism hangs in the balance. Furthermore, especially for those of us who affirm both the soteriological & theotic significance of the Incarnation, unitarianism, for example, undermines – not just our trinitological

& Christological dogma, but – the practical, hope-filled, dynamical approaches of our participatory anthropology & transfigurative cosmology. So, it’s not sufficient to learn true statements, creedally, or even speculative grammars, heuristically.
It’s necessary to inhabit the proper historical thought patterns, as they emerged from post-experiential encounters (exegetical & liturgical) of Christ. Such a successful inhabitation (existential) presupposes our own holistic encounters of Christ in Scripture,
worship & theosis — encounters that must be adequately ortho-communal, ortho-pathic, ortho-praxic & ortho-theotic if our thought patterns are ever to be sufficiently ortho-doxic. Translated, right belonging, right desiring, right behaving & right becoming
will best foster right believing. Only then can we optimally engage, historically, the proper thought patterns (patristic &/or scholastic) & go beyond mere recitations of true statements & mere rehearsals of proper grammars to authentically encounter Christ &
will best foster right believing. Only then can we optimally engage, historically, the proper thought patterns (patristic &/or scholastic) & go beyond mere recitations of true statements & mere rehearsals of proper grammars to authentically encounter Christ &
to truthfully bear witness to Him in our thoughts, words & deeds. Otherwise, we’ll talk the talk, creedally, but may inadvertently find ourselves in material heresies, not just christological or trinitological (as in the example above), but walking the walks of gnosticism,
historicism, manichaeism, antinomianism, donatism, iconoclasm, pelagianism, jansenism, or worst of all, a practical nihilism.
#

Scotus is definitely in the “felix culpa or not” camp. It took Maximus to properly extend the implications of the 3C’s further. Going beyond the Cappadocians, Cyril (mia-physite) & Chalcedon, in identifying the Logos’ divine will with the logoi.

Maximus advanced our understanding of deification, when he recognized it as the corollary of Christ’s humanization. That’s to say that creation was the means toward the end of the Incarnation, which, itself, provides the means toward the end of our deification (& salvation).

When talking about the divine being or essence, aseity means “not made.” When talking about divine persons or hypostases, aseity has a different meaning – “not from.” All of the persons are “not made,” but only the Father is “not from” God.

To what might such an eternal (not temporal) cause, origin or principle (aitia, arche or principium) refer? Communication. The Father freely & willingly communicates Love, eternally loving (begetting) the Son, loving (spirating) the Holy Spirit & loving (exnihilating) creation.

All persons then participate in the Logoi proportionate to the nature of their being, e. g. God “from” God, “made” by God, hypostatic union, etc
#

While neither Maximus nor Scotus viewed the Incarnation as a result of some felix culpa, that conclusion was a response to different questions posed by each. There’s little doubt that they would’ve very much agreed with each other.
Oversimplifying, but – Maximus inquired after the purpose of creation, concluding it was the means toward the end of the Incarnation. Scotus inquired after the purpose of the Incarnation, concluding it was to communicate divine love & Ad majórem Dei glóriam.
When we conceive of divine freedom (e.g. creative) in terms of w/& w/o ratio, as variously ungrounded, constitutively-grounded &/or self-grounded, what’s “constitutively grounded” would refer to – not an essential necessity, but – a volitional inevitability.
All is distant from God, and is remote from Him not by place but by nature— ou tôpo alla physei— as St. John Damascene explains. And this distance is never removed, but is only, as it were, overlapped by immeasurable Divine love. ~ Archpriest Georges Florovsky

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian and Byzantine Writers ~ Bogdan G. Bucur https://academia.edu/4996258/Foreordained_from_All_Eternity_The_Mystery_of_the_Incarnation_According_to_Some_Early_Christian_and_Byzantine_Writers

Foreordained from All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to Some Early Christian…

academia.edu
#

While recognizing that “dance” clearly lacks philological warrant, LaCugna valued dance because of its metaphorical effectiveness. Still, what justifies a metaphor that portrays such a human participation in divine operations?
Well, even if not ad intra trinitarian taxis, certainly the hypostatic union. The perichoretic concept was used in late Patristic Trinitology to convey – not circle dance, but – mutual interpenetration or permeation without merging or mixing (Maximus & the Damascene).
But, such a concept was first employed in early Patristic Christology by the Cappadocians (Nyssen & Nazianzen). While the Trinitarian perichoresis refers to homogenous, consubstantial realities, the Christological refers heterogenously & heterosubstantially.
The practical upshot?
There’s no reason it can’t refer cosmotheandrically!
Beyond Christological perichoresis, the Logos-logoi identity of Maximus further emphasizes how we as creatures participate, albeit proportional to our being, in divinity, for the very same logoi that humanize the divine also divinize the human.
Dance thus remains a great metaphor, even if much of Western theology stumbled upon it accidentally!
cf. Stamatović, Slobodan. (2016). The Meaning of Perichoresis. Open Theology. 2. 10.1515/opth-2016-0026.
#
As w/equivocal uses of God (eg predicate, name), so too re Oneness (eg essential unicity, unitary energeia, hypostatic unity, monarchical uniqueness). Behr’s concern seems to be that MOF most straightforwardly reconciles w/monotheism? Which oneness does monotheism most implicate?
The Capps reconcile with Augustine, Cyril, Aquinas, Scotus, Maximus, Palamas, RC, EO & much of Protestantism on MOF & ousia. Even if for Scotus it’s a primary substance & immanent universal, like TA, it remains communicable but indivisible. Scotus is more felicitous w/Capps is all.
#
Evokes for me the aesthetic teleology of those who employ metaphors fr complexity theory & nonequilibrium thermodynamics, except they say (of dissipative structures): the more complex, the more fragile (due to number of permutations that can be threatened), the more beautiful.

Since the Beautiful beyond all beauty acts eternally as a Simplicity beyond all simplicity with no residues like fragility, those metaphors seem to express an antinomy that’s not mediated ontologically but teleologically, e.g. via the Maximian Logos-logoi
#
The paterological uniqueness of the MOF is not in the least over against the essential unicity, unitary energeia or hypostatic unity. Still, we best get this historical account correct
because the proper reconciliation of monotheism & trinitarianism hangs in the balance. Furthermore, especially for those of us who affirm both the soteriological & theotic significance of the Incarnation, unitarianism, for example, undermines – not just our trinitological
& Christological dogma, but – the practical, hope-filled, dynamical approaches of our participatory anthropology & transfigurative cosmology. So, it’s not sufficient to learn true statements, creedally, or even speculative grammars, heuristically.
#
Scotus is definitely in the “felix culpa or not” camp. It took Maximus to properly extend the implications of the 3C’s further. Going beyond the Cappadocians, Cyril (mia-physite) & Chalcedon, in identifying the Logos’ divine will with the divine logoi, Maximus advanced our understanding of deification, when he recognized it as the corollary of Christ’s humanization. That’s to say that creation was the means toward the end of the Incarnation, which, itself, provides the means toward the end of our deification (& salvation).
#
Another нет (nyet) to Aquinas’ irreversibility thesis & да to Maximian irrevocability! “Scotus is particularly dismissive of the view (held by others besides Thomas) that angels, once they choose, choose irrevocably (ibid. d.7 esp. nn.9–26).
The possibility is expressly left open by Scotus that some angels sinned but repented (ibid. d.6 q.2 n.78).” So, not all medieval speculative angelology supports Feser’s post-mortem anthropology & related infernalistic premises.
I’d continue to insist that “habitus,” whether as one’s virtuous &/or vicious secondary nature, remains always situated between formal acts & final potencies, facilitating or crippling but never “killing” those potentialities, which remain eternally immersed in Divine Logoi.
#
Yes. Scotus holds the keys to any coherent angelology: All finite causes must be together, spatially, to produce an effect. I’d made up a little heuristic to navigate such distinctions but, instead, relied on the term “embodied.” Scotus departs from TA in many regards.
1) in/communicable essence? all essences, divine & creaturely are communicable 2) dis/embodied? all creaturely entities are naturally embodied (communicatability & spatial extendability) 3) in/animate? some entities are animate & some animate entities are agential 4) in/corporeal agents? angels & contingently dis/carnate souls are incorporeal 5) im/material? agential formal causes are immaterial 6) presence spatially located operationally (Aquinas) or per se (Scotus)?
#

How might our experience of God serve as an authoritative source of theology? Peter Neumann employs the Wesleyan Quadrilateral to engage the projects of 3 contemporary Pentecostal theologians: D. Macchia, Simon K.H. Chan & Amos Yong …
placing them in dialogue w/Catholic, Orthodox & Protestant streams: Congar, E Johnson & D Gelpi; Lossky & Bulgakov; & Moltmann, J Cone & Jenson. Pentecostal Experience: An Ecumenical Encounter, Pickwick Publications 2012 I resonate most w/ Yong, Gelpi, Bulgakov & Moltmann.
Yong echoes the “warning of Robert Jenson that the tension in pneumatology between the particularity of the Spirit in Jesus & in the Church & the universality of the Spirit as a cosmic reality ‘strains Western intellectual tradition to breaking . . .

To identify in other religious traditions elements of grace capable of sustaining the positive response of their members to God’s invitation is much more difficult. It requires a discernment for which criteria have to be established. ~ Giovanni Cereti http://vatican.va/jubilee_2000/magazine/documents/ju_mag_01091997_p-56_en.html

cf Discerning the Spirit in World Religions: The Search for Criteria by Benno van den Toren in The Spirit Is Moving: New Pathways in Pneumatology, Studies in Reformed Theology, V 38 pp 215–231, Ed: Gijsbert van den Brink, Eveline van Staalduine-Sulman & Maarten Wisse

cf KirsteenKim, The Holy Spirit in the world: a global conversation

The Holy Spirit in the world: a global conversation

Because experiential discernment criteria (Kirsteen Kim) will have ecclesial (confess Jesus is Lord), ethical (fruits), charismatic (gifts) & liberational aspects , we have to go beyond a mere hierarchical episcopal magisterium (vis a vis Scripture & tradition)

to include other magisteria. Theologians, laity, the poor & marginalized & believers of non-Christian religions must also be considered to achieve authoritative teaching (Peter Phan). I would add criteria related to a growth in intimacy, i.e. devotional, theotic, etc

As we go forward to better establish pneumatological discernment criteria in a global context – not just theistic, but – Christic criteria remain essential, because Christ remains – not just our norm, but – our Goal.
#
If not for a healthy aporetic sense, paraconsistent logic, dialethism, antinomism, semiformal systems, gödelian axiomatic constraints, our speculative approaches to quantum, cosmic, life, sentience & language origins would explode. The Trinity? Got a sylly syllogism for that!
#

The Capps reconcile with Augustine, Cyril, Aquinas, Scotus, Maximus, Palamas, RC, EO & much of Protestantism on MOF & ousia. Even if for Scotus it’s a primary substance & immanent universal, like TA, it remains communicable but indivisible. Scotus more felicitous w/Capps is all. As w/equivocal uses of God (eg predicate, name), so too re Oneness (eg essential unicity, unitary energeia, hypostatic unity, monarchical uniqueness). Behr’s concern seems to be that MOF most straightforwardly reconciles w/monotheism? Which oneness does monotheism most implicate?
#
Evokes for me the aesthetic teleology of those who employ metaphors fr complexity theory & nonequilibrium thermodynamics, except they say (of dissipative structures): the more complex, the more fragile (due to number of permutations that can be threatened), the more beautifulSince the Beautiful beyond all beauty acts eternally as a Simplicity beyond all simplicity with no residues like fragility, those metaphors seem to express an antinomy that’s not mediated ontologically but teleologically, e.g. via the Maximian Logos-logoi identity?

#
The paterological uniqueness of the MOF is not in the least over against the essential unicity, unitary energeia or hypostatic unity. Still, we best get this historical account correct
because the proper reconciliation of monotheism & trinitarianism hangs in the balance. Furthermore, especially for those of us who affirm both the soteriological & theotic significance of the Incarnation, unitarianism, for example, undermines – not just our trinitological

& Christological dogma, but – the practical, hope-filled, dynamical approaches of our participatory anthropology & transfigurative cosmology. So, it’s not sufficient to learn true statements, creedally, or even speculative grammars, heuristically.
It’s necessary to inhabit the proper historical thought patterns, as they emerged from post-experiential encounters (exegetical & liturgical) of Christ. Such a successful inhabitation (existential) presupposes our own holistic encounters of Christ in Scripture,
worship & theosis — encounters that must be adequately ortho-communal, ortho-pathic, ortho-praxic & ortho-theotic if our thought patterns are ever to be sufficiently ortho-doxic. Translated, right belonging, right desiring, right behaving & right becoming
will best foster right believing. Only then can we optimally engage, historically, the proper thought patterns (patristic &/or scholastic) & go beyond mere recitations of true statements & mere rehearsals of proper grammars to authentically encounter Christ &
will best foster right believing. Only then can we optimally engage, historically, the proper thought patterns (patristic &/or scholastic) & go beyond mere recitations of true statements & mere rehearsals of proper grammars to authentically encounter Christ &
to truthfully bear witness to Him in our thoughts, words & deeds. Otherwise, we’ll talk the talk, creedally, but may inadvertently find ourselves in material heresies, not just christological or trinitological (as in the example above), but walking the walks of gnosticism,
historicism, manichaeism, antinomianism, donatism, iconoclasm, pelagianism, jansenism, or worst of all, a practical nihilism.
#

Scotus is definitely in the “felix culpa or not” camp. It took Maximus to properly extend the implications of the 3C’s further. Going beyond the Cappadocians, Cyril (mia-physite) & Chalcedon, in identifying the Logos’ divine will with the logoi.

Maximus advanced our understanding of deification, when he recognized it as the corollary of Christ’s humanization. That’s to say that creation was the means toward the end of the Incarnation, which, itself, provides the means toward the end of our deification (& salvation).

Ur-kenosis & Ur-analogy in a Trinitarian, Kenotic Panentheism – Bracken’s Peircean approach can bring Hegel, Bulgakov & others together

One might appropriate Hegel & Bulgakov through Peircean lenses, using, for example, Joe Bracken’s panentheism.

One can thereby also avoid any apparent (Hegel) or latent (Bulgakov) nominalist tendencies (thick in Whitehead, thin in Hartshorne) and affirm a robustly Trinitarian & kenotic panentheism.

Hegel (too deterministic? I’m not so sure. See thought experiment, below.), perhaps, needs an appropriation of Peirce (no nominalism) & Schelling (personalist, more freedom) for his panentheism to be distinguished from Aurobindo’s, and to conform more to Bracken’s panentheism, which is more consistent with Classical Theism.

The following makes sense within such a stance:

Clayton cites Hegel’s recognition that the logic of the infinite requires the inclusion of the finite in the infinite and points towards the presence of the world in God (Clayton 2004b, 78–79). Clayton, along with Joseph Bracken (1974; 2004), identifies his understanding of panentheism as Trinitarian and kenotic (Clayton 2005, 255). It is Trinitarian because the world participates in God in a manner analogous to the way that members of the trinity participate in each other although the world is not and does not become God. God freely decides to limit God’s infinite power in an act of kenosis in order to allow for the existence of non-divine reality. The divine kenotic decision results in the actuality of the world that is taken into God.
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2012/entries/panentheism/

It seems that, as long as we don’t misconceive Logos & logoi (e g. of Maximus, Neo-platonists, etc) as universals, thoughts or ideas, i.e. abstractly, in essential or formal terms, but think of them in concrete terms of a freely acting Person with intentions or wills, reasons or purposes, to Whom some end is “fitting,” —

Then, we can apply the Anselmian principle, potuit, decuit, ergo fecit: ‘twas possible & “fitting,” ergo accomplished – to all Trinitarian missio ad extra, both vestigia of the gratuity of creation and oikonomia of soteriology & theosis of the gratuity of grace, without attributing such contingent effects to a *necessity* as would be grounded in God’s nature, divine esse naturale, but, instead attributing same to an *inevitability* grounded in God’s Will, divine esse intentionale.

As a thought experiment, how might Hegel’s determinism be cast in (or reconciled to) Maximian terms of logoi, Peircean realist (not nominalist) terms & a Scotist libertarian will, all in defense of a strong apocatastasis, e.g. consistent with Hart, perhaps.

If one conceives of both Scotus & Maximus as libertarians, for whom the intellect’s necessarily operative but not wholly determinative in volition, where self-determinative volitional acts remain limited in potency to the logoi of being, well-being, and eternal being, then, the creature self-determines – not its depth, but – its breadth of being.

The creature self-determines the kenotic scope of its theotic participation (perhaps even choosing to annihilate much of it), while God, alone, determines the kenotic intensity of that participation (in an aesthetic teleology).

Whatever one’s eschatological anthropology, any irreversibility could only refer to one’s self-determination of scope, i.e. in terms of foregoing superabundant being. Existence, itself, abundantly & gratuitously, partakes of being over against nonbeing, limited in potency to divine logoi (rather than, e.g. merely uncreated essences or universals).

If appetitive movements cease in some instance, e.g. due to closure of a creaturely epistemic distance, at some moment like a particular judgment, then, per the determinative Maximian logoi, this could not entail a cessation of ardor vis a vis the depth of one’s desires & loves, i.e. the very fact that one desires & loves per an intrinsic orientation, but only could refer to a self-determination regarding the breadth of those ardors.

Some may call this eternal ill-being, if they must, but ill*being* would strike me as a paragon of oxymorons, i.e. once considering the intrinsic goodness of any and all participation in Being, itself, beyond all being.

The thought that some of us might populate the firmament like a tiny votive candle, while others might shine forth like a blazing helios, would not likely be off-putting to anyone, who’s ever been a parent, whose love for each child knows no bounds, no limits, and differs in neither depth nor breadth, intensity nor scope, from one to the next, however much they participate or reciprocate in family-being, however differently abled regarding, or disposed toward, same.

So, as parents, we’ll always pray: That our children & grandchildren may become holier than us, provided that we may become as holy as we should, Jesus, grant us the grace to desire it.

At any rate, that’s where I was headed, when suggesting:

I conceive the afterlife as a state wherein the will remains, eternally, in relation to an extrinsic aesthetic scope, however otherwise unsurpassable the realization of one’s intrinsic aesthetic intensity. (This is an imago Dei riff on the divine esse intentionale.) This requires a conception of volition, whereby one, while only ever freely willing that which is suited both to one’s advantage & justice (& never freely pursuing privatio boni or evil for evil), also enjoys the radical freedom to choose – from among the infinity of aesthetic options as they’ll lay before us in eternity, none, in any way, suboptimal (an eternal Pareto Frontier). This requires my Scotist conception of quasi-libertarian freedom, which would include the power to refrain from willing one optimal choice, while willing another (equally optimal), both choices self-interested & both just.

O Jesus! meek and humble of heart, Hear me.
From the desire of being esteemed,
Deliver me, Jesus.
From the desire of being loved…
From the desire of being extolled …
From the desire of being honored …
From the desire of being praised …
From the desire of being preferred to others…
From the desire of being consulted …
From the desire of being approved …
From the fear of being humiliated …
From the fear of being despised…
From the fear of suffering rebukes …
From the fear of being calumniated …
From the fear of being forgotten …
From the fear of being ridiculed …
From the fear of being wronged …
From the fear of being suspected …
That others may be loved more than I,
Jesus, grant me the grace to desire it.
That others may be esteemed more than I …
That, in the opinion of the world,
others may increase and I may decrease …
That others may be chosen and I set aside …
That others may be praised and I unnoticed …
That others may be preferred to me in everything…
That others may become holier than I, provided that I may become as holy as I should…

Litany of Humility
Rafael Cardinal Merry del Val (1865-1930),
Secretary of State for Pope Saint Pius X

A Further Defense of my Eschatological Anthropology

In further defense of this apocatastatic hypothesis, let me further defend its eschatological anthropology, which employs an analogy of divine and determinate esse naturale & intentionale, the determinate as imago Dei.

By aesthetic depth or intensity, I refer to the ontological density of the human person’s essential nature, which, in the great chain of being, transcends (but includes) all teleo-potent, teleo-matic, teleo-nomic & teleo-qualic realities as a teleo-logic reality, as the symbolic species.

From the anthropological account of a Peircean axiological epistemology, this entails an holistic epistemic suite, marked by an aesthetic primacy (no more voluntarist than the Scotist’s primacy of will). As such, we distinguish the determinate esse naturale and intentionale only formally, as integrally related, inseparable aspects of the human person.

God gifts this reality, an imago Dei, an absolute, intrinsic value, the perfection of which cannot be enhanced or diminished by extrinsic changes in the aesthetic scope of its esse intentionale.

Aside from the gifts of its existence & redemption, where this makes some sense, what are we to make of theotic realizations, of Lonergan’s secular & religious conversions, of our journeys to Authenticity & Sustained Authenticity, of mystical theology’s Ways of Perfection, of Ascetic Theology’s path from the false to True Self, where this makes less sense?

In other words, to what does Transformation refer in terms of any reality’s movement from vestige to image to likeness?

Transformative movements, in my view, refer to all manner of self-transcendence, a by-product of which is self-actualization.

Such movements, per Bernardian love, move us from

  • love of self for sake of self,
  • love of God for sake of self,
  • love of God for sake of God, to
  • love of self for sake of God.

Ignatius similarly gives account of this journey in his Degrees of Humility.

More simply put, we move from imperfect to perfect contrition, from the eros of self-enlightenment to the agape of Gospel love.

Imperfect contrition is necessary and sufficient, however, for increased beatitude!

Even love of self for sake of self, that most basic of desires, the storge’ & eros of Lewis’ Four Loves, remains both necessary & sufficient in a human reality that’s already essentially & absolutely, intrinsically valuable to God, as an imago Dei, which comprises a perfection, which cannot be enhanced or diminished by such extrinsic changes as could never increase its dignity or worth, only its beatitude.

We might, therefore, introduce a distinction between more perfect redemptions & salvations (as Scotus introduced for the Immaculate Conception, which I, then, analogously applied to post-mortem, eschatological anthropology) and more perfect creatures, in and of themselves, ontologically. The former apply, beatitudinally, while the latter would apply, essentially & existentially, except for the fact that it does not, since the intrinsic value of persons is already & ever absolute.

Transformation, therefore, refers to sanctification & glorification, growing as holy as He would desire & passing from glory to glory in eternal beatitude, as one’s will might self-determine vis a vis its desired aesthetic scope.

Does this trivialize mortal sin? Does it sanction quietism? Does it amount to an insidious indifferentism? Does it obviate soteriological discourse?

Let’s foreground the distinctions I’ve introduced above.

As St John of the Cross pointed out, God’s creatio continua holds the soul in existence even in mortal sin. What’s placed in jeopardy is never the absolute intrinsic value of the person’s existence, only its own extrinsic realizations of other values (that are also of absolute intrinsic value, in and of themselves, i.e. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love & Freedom, the pursuits of which are their own rewards).

Here, the quest, itself, becomes one’s grail, the journey – one’s destination, the sitting – one’s consolation.

This is because, naked personal existence, itself, only ever pursues any values, via transformative value pursuits, because, in and of itself, it already constitutively & necessarily possesses them in goodly measure, precisely by already abundantly participating in that & Whom it would to possess, but is already possessed by. Thus it’s really only aspiring to be (and do) who it abundantly is already, only ever more fully, i.e. superabundantly.

A person, eternally being, could never be annihilated through self-determination & wouldn’t so be since the divine fiat, which has deemed it intrinsically good, has already deemed its existence fitting per divine esse intentionale. In so doing, such a personal act of existence was limited by divine logoi, one of which mirrors, via its determinate esse intentionale, a radical freedom – not of ontological density or aesthetic depth or intensity, but – of aesthetic breadth or scope.

Whether or not, after having crossed a sufficient (or even closed an essential) epistemic distance, this aesthetic scope remains irrevocably intact (a Maximian hypothesis) or irreversibly frozen (a Thomist hypothesis), the naked personal existent nevertheless “enjoys” its constitutive & abundant possession of and participation in Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love & Freedom, by virtue of an essential (naturale) participation, always journeying (intentionale) in Being, itself, beyond all being, because it’s never self-determined in its esse naturale, whether or not it happens to also be self-determined in its intentionale (via irrevocability or irreversibility).

It would seem exceptional, when anyone would forego (or appear, somehow, indifferent to) superabundance, settling into a quietistic stance. At the same time, a nevertheless abundant life would be sustained precisely by the soteriological efficacies that reach all, for all have been redeemed. Some do enjoy, via a self-determined aesthetic scope (limited in potency only by divine logoi) a superabundant beatitude.

What, then, of mortal sin? Even if that state somehow irreversibly freezes one’s determinate esse intentionale (foreclosing the possibility of any expansion of an essential, minimalist aesthetic scope), such as via an epistemic closure in a particular judgment, it cannot annihilate one’s essential existence or its absolute intrinsic value, personal dignity & extrinsic worth, as eternally loved by God & others, all expecting absolutely nothing in return.

Primal ur-kenosis, ad extra kenosis and the kenotic self-emptying of parents & lovers has always been this way?

We even recoil at every insidious form of ableism, which would value our children based on developmental milestones or setbacks, whether due to genetic, perinatal or accidental dis-ease, whether from deformative influences or the pangs of addiction, whether due simply to age or through their unfathomable dispositions & puzzling personality differences.

Who values a child at 20 more than one at 2?

Who loves a child, who’s a model of social grace, athletic grace or academic grace, more than one who’s on some spectrum, physically awkward or mentally struggling?

It’s all grace!

Who tells a child, if you don’t come to Thanksgiving Dinner, I will hire a hit man to take you out? Well, yeah, right. I guess that has been done, in so many ways, but it was with the best of intentions and highly nuanced.

No, I can buy that some will be votive candles in eternity, on fire with the same flame, ontologically, as others, who’ll outshine the sun. After all, life seems very much like that here and now. A lot of us quite rather be votive candles, truth be told. And I imagine that some earthly luminaries, who compete with the stars, themselves, may well be but votive candles in eternity, once their dross burns off.

What I can’t imagine is that any fire, whomsoever, will be extinguished, by one’s self or Another’s determination.

See ya on the other side.

Exploring the Other Side (well, one part, anyway)

Scotus locates the will in efficient causation. For many, this represents a conceptual relocation from the formal.
Conceiving the free will as efficient cause (in limited potency to material) implicates a volition that determines only WHETHER one exercises (or refrains therefrom) one’s will but not to WHAT it chooses, i.e. it must not refer to why this or that is chosen but only to why the will wills at all, because it does remain free not to act.

As such, the will refers to the sole rational potency, never acting without the intellect, which is co-causally operative (in bringing the Maximian logoi to bear) even though not finally determinative.

The will determines neither the act of existence in potency to essence nor the formal generically determinative act in potency to one’s final cause, which makes a human existent what one truly is, e.g. a human person, the symbolic species, an imago Dei, a beloved child of God, a sister of Jesus, a brother of the Cosmos.

Taken seriously, this has enormous soteriological and sophiological implications, which is to say, regarding redemption, justification & sanctification, i.e. intiation into communion, adoption into the Kingdom, on one hand, and, on the other, beatitude & glorification, i.e. ascetically & mystically or theotically, further establishing the Kingdom via communal collaboration.

In my view, Scotus would worry about the risk of any full blown liberty of indifference [1], i.e. including not just one’s aesthetic scope or efficient acts in limited potency to divine logoi, materially, but also, vis a vis aesthetic intensity (ontological density), existential acts (self-annihilation) in limited potency to divine logoi, essentially, as well as formal acts (generic self-determination) in limited potency to divine logoi, finally (as if we could become other than what we already are, what C.S. Lewis might call a “dismantling of humanity”). This amounts to what M. M. Adams would call a low doctrine of human agency [2], although I am not wholly familiar with her precise formulation and how it might comport with my own, above.

Any such exercise and actualization of rationality makes one’s efficient acts good and increases the being of the Kingdom, ecclesiologically, both proleptically & eschatologically. But does that also increase one’s own being, intrinsically, as per a Thomistic metaethic, per se changing one’s esse naturale per a generic determination? [3]

Or does it only change, per an agential extrinsic denomination, one’s esse intentionale?

Does moral evil frustrate an increase in the being of one’s esse naturale, even to the point of its full diminishment, so to speak undoing one’s intiation into communion and adoption into the Kingdom, denying one’s very aesthetic intensity & ontological density?

Rather, might it frustrate an increase in being only vis a vis one’s esse intentionale, foregoing further communal collaboration in the Kingdom, restricting one’s aesthetic scope, limiting one’s ecclesiological participation, as one neglects spiritual exercises and practices of presence? [4]

I’m not suggesting my anthropological categories & applications measure up with anthropological rigor or even capture the points of disagreement between, for example, Eleonore Stump & Marilyn M. Adams. Even if they amount to an ahistorical, eisegetic account of Aquinas & Scotus, though, perhaps they still have some normative integrity all their own?

If stable dispositions, derived from habitual spiritual exercices and practices of presence, to act in accordance with or contrary to one’s nature, i.e. virtues or vice, do produce second natures, whether virtuous or vicious, do those ontologically negate or just phenomenologically mask our primal human nature, hide the imago Dei?

In my view, our primal being and goodness is both unalienable, due to divine esse intentionale, & inalienable, not a capacity of determinate esse intentionale.

Eternally, are we dealt with in accordance with both or either of our natures, primary &/or secondary, however one conceives these volitional loci, as esse naturale or intentionale?

If the goodness of our being is thus light, will our existence in Hell thereby be unbearable?

Let’s consider Hart:
[T]he wrathful soul experiences the transfiguring and deifying fire of love not as bliss but as chastisement and despair. [5]

Does not this refer to the transformative & theotic dynamisms that I addressed, above. Will not those dynamisms cease post-mortem or in some eschatological closure of epistemic distance, such as in a particular judgment & life review? Hart doesn’t take this into account, when describing the tortures of hell, but only because he otherwise ultimately rejects an infernalist stance, not inconsistent with Bulgakov’s surmise that those dynamisms might continue post-mortem, finally rejecting eternal torment as a moral absurdity.

So, if those dynamisms terminate post-mortem, wouldn’t we necessarily only be dealt with in accordance with our primary nature, which would comport with Maximian being, eternal being and well-being?

Might ill-being only ever be a transitory, purgative state? Or even a misconstrual of an eternal esse intentionale, which remains volitionally indifferent to any aesthetic scope, beyond its original endowment, not inconsistent with a Scotistic free will, located in efficient not telic causes?

Bishop Barron [6] writes: If there are any people in Hell (and the church has never obliged us to believe that any human is in that state), they are there, not because God capriciously “sent” them, but because they absolutely insist on not joining in the party.

This isn’t wholly inconsistent with the view of volitional indifference to a self-constrained aesthetic scope, but, again, what of my point that human volition is not otherwise constituted by self-constraints regarding aesthetic intensity (ontological density), existentially or generically, regarding THAT one is or WHAT one primally is (whatever one believes regarding self-constructed secondary natures)?

How, then, would we psychologize that eternal disposition? I’m asking for a friend, who’s a social wallflower, who prefers to watch the mirrorball & swirling dervishes beneath, who doesn’t mind others coming over to sit in silent presence (90% is showing up, only 10% is dancing, perichoretically or otherwise?), while they keep the finger sandwiches & beers coming. One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens?

As John O’Brien observers: Concerning the detailed specific nature of hell … the Catholic Church has defined nothing. … It is useless to speculate about its true nature, and more sensible to confess our ignorance in a question that evidently exceeds human understanding. [7]

Fr Richard Rohr writes: To be frank, I think that perhaps no single belief has done more to undercut the spiritual journey of more Western people than the belief that God could be an eternal torturer of people who do not like him or disobey him. And this after Jesus exemplified and taught us to love our enemies and forgive offenses 70 x 7 times! The very idea of Hell (with a capital ‘H’), as Jon Sweeney explains in this magnificent book, constructs a very toxic and fear-based universe, starting at its very center and ground. Hatred, exclusion, and mistreatment of enemies is legitimated all the way down the chain of command.” [8]

Jon Sweeney writes: “Ultimately, I choose not Dante’s vengeful, predatory God who is anxious to tally faults, to reward and to punish. Instead I choose the God who creates and sustains us, who is incarnate and wants to be among us, and the God who inspires and comforts us. That God is the real one, the one I have come to know and understand, and that God has nothing to do with the medieval Hell.” [9]

Conclusions

Following Scotus, I intuit that no eternally self-constrained aesthetic intensity is possible, neither existentially (THAT) nor generically (WHAT).

And with Rohr & Sweeney, I’ll simply insist, apophatically, on what an eternally self-constrained aesthetic scope simply must NOT be like.

Then, with O’Brien, I’ll confess ignorance, kataphatically.

Notes:

A Logo-centric Account of Apophasis with a quick nod to Lossky & Staniloae

How Scotus’ Univocity of Being Grounds a Metaphysics of Participation

Scotus’ univocity somewhat entails Anselm’s ontological proof, where “pure perfections,” which are predicable of God alone, refer to being none greater than which can be conceived. Thus, from aspects of determinate being, which self-evidently make creatures better, we can devise composite concepts that apply only to God. Such aspects are transcendentals, because they are coextensive with being, transcending this finite and infinite division of being.

Scotus’ proper attributes (one, good & true) are also transcendentals. The supercategory of disjunctive transcendentals, like finite & infinite and contingent & necessary, for Scotus, prove God’s existence.

The less perfect member of each disjunction are possibilities that may or may not be actualized, creation being contingent and dependent on the divine will and not a necessary & inevitable emanation. The pure perfections, which don’t presuppose some limitation, are transcendentals but, of course, not coextensive.

The above conceptions of being, for Scotus, are predicable in quale and not in quid, hence are predicable denominatively (essential difference or nonessential property) not determinatively (what is it? genus? species?).

In Peircean terms, qualia correspond to possibilities (firstness or 1ns) and not genera-lities (thirdness or 3ns) and can refer to properties (qualia not quiddities) we may conceptually abstract from actualities (secondness or 2ns). This distinction is crucial, for it distinguishes between a semantical univocity, which follows a grammar of naming, and what would otherwise be an ontological univocity, which follows a grammar of categories of existence, i.e. regarding features or properties possessed as formal acts in potency to a final telos. While every quiddity is an essence, not every essence is a quiddity. Scotus’ univocity refers to qualia not quiddities.

Scotus’ univocity still supports a distinction, however, between theo-poetic nomination & theo-logical attribution, but not the vicious form of attribution DBH laments in a univocal ontology. The distinction lies, instead, in that between icons, images, diagrams & metaphors, on one hand, and similes & analogies, on the other, the latter as explicit & literal, the former as implicit, all as possibilities, not generalities.

The reason these subtle distinctions of the Subtle Doctor are crucial, in my view, is that they set forth how both theo-poetic nomination (idiomata) & theo-logical attribution (propria), more modestly conceived, are consonant with our metaphysics of participation.

Indeed, triadically and semiotically, participatively, we are drawn beyond our iconic (peircean 1ns) & indexical (2ns) SIGN-ifications of divine names & locations, and thereby led to our robustly relational symbolic (3ns) engagements, spanning the infinite interval – not just theopoetically & theologically, but -doxologically & theotically!

No, the Divine Economy is Not Trickle Down! — The Flipping of the Divine Donative Script

What’s the nature of our participation in the divine oikonomia?

The trinitarian paterological ur-kenosis, via the divine nature, opens up the eternal distance (economically & intimately) that the Son & Spirit may truly be. (Bathasarian)

The pneumatological kenosis, via the divine will, opens up the infinite analogical interval between God and the gratuity of creation that determinate creatures could truly be. (Hartian)

The Christological kenosis, via the divine will, opens up the infinite possibilities that determinate persons could truly be-come love via the gratuity of grace. The Trinity thereby flipped the divine donative script, when, via the hypostatic union, Jesus participated in human nature. And He did this as a real personhood (enhypostasis), which belonged to Him, alone (anhypostasis).

These divine kenoses, via epektasis, open up an infinite human desire (aesthetically), and via ekstasis, open up the space for one to stand outside one’s self (relationally & personally). (Bulgakov, Balthasar, Hart & Zizioulas?)

I explain later, below, that human persons traverse these distances theopoetically, theologically and relationally. DBH would say rhetorically (via theological nomination) and epistemologically (via philosophical attribution).

And we might all agree that, by relationally, we mean Eucharistically (liturgically & sacramentally, doxologically & theotically).

In the personal and relational sense, in all forms of kenoses, including the paterological, pneumatological, Christological and our Eucharistic participations, we might see, in sharp relief, Zizioulas’ conception of person playing out, i.e. that of other & communion, economy & intimacy, epektasis & ekstasis.

If our analogia gift us, semantically, icons & indexes (signs & locations) of divine encounters (knowledge about God), it is finally a Eucharistic participation that will symbolically & efficaciously (semiotic pragmatism) gift us divine Communion (knowledge of God).

Our determinate oikonomia are the divine oikonomia & the economic trinity is the immanent trinity, just not vice versa, as the Trinity perpetually opens eternal distances (ad intra) and infinite intervals (ad extra), precisely that we might be, might become & might commune, forever & ever! Amen?

Now, has this not opened up the eternal space & infinite interval where we may all reasonably hope for ἀποκατάστασις ?

The Semiotic Eucharistic Cycle

Liturgy of the Word

  • Iconic theo-poetic nomination of divine names

  • Indexic theo-logic attribution of divine locations

Liturgy of the Eucharist

  • Symbolic doxological & theotic engagement of divine participations

Offertory – Ecstasis & Proodos as self-transcendence

Communion – Enstasis & Mone as union

Post Communion – Epecstasis & Epistrophe as self-reception

Dismissal (Ecstasis & Proodos)

Unitive Living (Enstasis & Mone)

ReturnIntroibo ad Altare Dei (Epecstasis & Epistrophe)

Liturgy of the Word – repeat the cycle

There’s Nothing Ontological About Scotus’ Univocity of Being

Because Scotus’ univocity of being refers to a semantic not ontological thesis, it’s – not only not over against analogy, but -tacitly relied upon on by, thereby integral to, analogy. It’s a thesis about language or how we think & talk about God and not about ontology or what God is.

So, does analogy with its implicit univocity still take back all the meaning it ostensibly gives?

It takes back a LOT but not ALL because our God-concepts are, at least, grounded empirically.

Like icons, images, similes & metaphors, both our univocal & analogical terms are likenesses or similarities of the realities they SIGN-ify or bring to mind, prior to conveying any complete meaning, which may or not be “fixed.”

For example, whiteness (Scotus’ example, in fact) is such a concept as can signify more than one reality irrespective of their generic ontological differences. And it can do so with a fixed meaning, too, even though it conveys nothing, in and of itself, ontologically, about different white things, i.e. neither what they are nor how they came to be white. (Scotus is not nominalist but moderately realist regarding universals, but that’s another conversation.) It’s thus a mental construct that’s been abstracted away from the things it variously signifies, while otherwise “proper” to none of them.

Once modalized as a white sheep or white Corvette, we have two new “composite” concepts.

Substitute “loving” for whiteness, “finitely” for sheep & “infinitely” for Corvette and one can see that the meaning of loving is fixed and so has some empirical bearing on our understanding of God, but the composite concept “infinitely loving” is qualitatively different & refers only to God.

Such an understanding remains rather meager, to be sure, but nevertheless sufficient to avoid wholesale equivocation, thereby rescuing the syllogisms of natural theology’s Analogia Entis from fallacy. It gifts us an imperfect knowledge and a small amount at that, but it’s an empirical – not just semantic & conceptual – knowledge of a very BIG & ULTIMATE reality, so, can have profound existential import, doxologically & theotically.

It’s only an ontological univocity of being, as a generic category, that should draw anyone’s metaphysical fire or raise anyone’s theological ire.

There’s Nothing Esoteric About Apophasis

One afternoon, one notices that the glass vase, which normally rests on an outdoor table in their backyard, has been shattered into so many pieces & that one of the bricks on the house’s rear wall has been cracked. One immediately infers that a projectile from over the back fence did the damage, then tries to muse to the best explanation, unable to find the offending object.

Taking out one’s compass, protractor & sliderule, estimating the projectile’s velocity, angle of trajectory, distance travelled, putative weight & such, the resident rules out the object having been thrown, fired from a potato cannon, tossed by a pitching machine, flung by a lawnmower and so on. For now, the determinable effects remain proper to no known causes.

Those effects were not entirely dissimilar to those one might expect from zinged marbles, fired potatoes, thrown baseballs or flung rocks, but, at bottom, were inconsistent with such acts even though, in certain other ways, very much like them.

The resident cleans up the mess & replaces the vase. It happens again! The resident, again, does forensic measurements, cleans up the mess & replaces the vase. It happens a third time! Still, the effects remain proper to no known causes. But, now, the resident starts to take the cause “personally.”

What kind of person is doing this and how? Well, it can’t be the sweet little old childless widow, who lives there. Of course, then, not any grandchild. And it’s positively not her yardkeeper, house-cleaner or physical therapist. It must be a neighborhood prankster, but one without a name or motive.

We’ve talked very intelligibly about this unknown personal cause, only able to make successful semantic references but unable to make good ontological descriptions of the actor or the actor’s specific machinations. We have employed analogies that apply literally, qualifying them with all manner of apophatic negations.

You see, there’s nothing occult or gnostic about apophasis. It’s quite quotidian in application, with a positive epistemic valence, even, as a supplemental way of increasing descriptive accuracy by saying what something is not or is not like.

Pip did this in Great Expectations, searching for – not a malefactor, but – benefactor. Ralph McInerny has described us as Characters in Search of Their Author.

Not just the fast & frugal heuristics of common sense employ such abductive inference, ananoetics & apophasis, as this has long been the tradecraft of our highly speculative theoretic sciences, of quantum interpretations & philosophies of mind, of undiscovered elements on the Periodic Table & putative genes carrying the traits of Mendel’s peas.

Yes, our God-talk traffics only in successful references not ontological descriptions and takes back, apophatically, more than what it gifts, analogically. But that’s just the philosophical part of our human episteme. It, at least, renders our beliefs reasonable, partly intelligible even if not wholly comprehensible.

For some, that serves as the praeambula fidei to making the existential leap in responding to special revelation, musing that, if Jesus of Nazareth & his People Gathered are that loving, that beautiful, that good, that liberative, then, maybe just maybe, I can reasonably hope He & They are also that True!

That’s what this entire blog is really all about, reconciling Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Palamas & Peirce, Bulgakov & Bracken, Zizioulas & Scotus.

When I say “successful reference” to God, I mean that literally in a robustly ontological sense.

From divine vestigia of the gratuity of creation via general revelation & energeia-oikonomia of the gratuity of grace via special revelation, I say we can infer from those divine effects, which are proper to no known causes, a putative Actus Purus.

Because the nondeterminate divine ousia & hypostases involve Act sans potency, similarities to the acts of determinate beings are far outnumbered by dissimilarities.

From a separate conversation, I’d written:

A practical take-away from Neville (following Peirce’s semantics):

Modally, if one takes an analogy to be a type of possibility (e.g. along w/ icons, images, diagrams, similes & metaphors, which are similarity-invoking), then, as a form of indeterminacy, it might be treated as a case of vagueness, where noncontradiction [PNC] wouldn’t apply?

We’d thus distinguish it from that form of indeterminacy, modal generality, where excluded middle wouldn’t apply but a continuum of probabilities could (scalar).

Without PNC, a great deal of epistemic humility‘s warranted in all analogy-discourse!

Dissimilarities abound!

Apophasis thus redounds!

When DB Hart gets outdone with some neo-scholastics, it’s because they apparently give more weight to the Analogia than it can epistemically bear. <<<

We believe, then, that nondeterminate divine realities cause determinate effects – vestigia, energeia & oikonomia & invite our participation. But what is the “nature” of our participation, considering divine acts are nondeterminate and/or self-determinate & ours determinate? Is there anything univocal going on?

It seems to me that when we cooperate with the divine gratuities of creation & grace, we as creatures foster the very same doxological & theotic effects as the Trinitological Synergy, soteriologically, sophiologically, ecclesiologically, eschatologically & sacramentally. We do this imitatively & instrumentally, by actively surrendering, kenotically, thereby becoming passive conduits, pneumatologically.

Correcting Bulgakov w/Bracken, I imagine a panentheistic, divine matrix, which, participatorily, not only involves us creatively & imitatively, but, which neo-platonic-like, also influences us diffusively & substratively, as the divine telos gently coaxes us toward the fulfillment of our human nature (sustained authenticity).

I guess I’m suggesting that there’s a participatory univocity of loving effects via our determinate kenosis, imitating Jesus’ self-determinate kenosis, unleashing the Spirit’s gifts, charisms & universal salvation.

Flipping the Semantic Script for Determinate & Divine Being

Turning this thing on its head has been precisely how I’ve come to approach this all. The more jargonistic way of condensing my above contributions is to wit:

Determinate syllosistics are derived from divine syllogistics.

If one begins with the Athanasian Creed, then formalizes it, one gets Abelard’s 3 modes of identity: essential, personal & formal.

The first 2 modes do not apply to determinate being, precisely due to radical dissimilarities in predications of ousia & exemplifications of hypostases.

For determinate realities, the only mode of identity is formal & we can consider it a derivation of divine syllogistics (rather than taking them to be an ad hoc strategy of our Aristotelian-like syllogistics).

Of course, for determinate realities, essence, hypostases & forms (the last = generalities, laws, regularities) reflect modes of being.

This doesn’t gift us a formal systematic accounting but it very much entails a rather robust semi-formal heuristic. This is the intersection where determinate effects interact, inter-participatively, as they variously ensue from divine nondeterminate or self-determinate realities or from creaturely determinate realities, either which can, variously, generate “effects proper to no known causes” whether putatively theological, metaphysical, scientific or common sensical.

It’s from the synergistic divine vestigia, energeia & oikonomia that we abductively infer a putative divine cause, Actus. We can thus affirm Rahner’s axiom that the economic trinity is the immanent trinity, even though many of us would hesitate regarding any vice versa. At least, I can’t go there.

Rahner spoke of a divine quasi-formal cause. Inverting the script, though, perhaps it’s better said that it’s our Aristotelian-like categories that are quasi, not the divine categories:

  • quasi-formal in potency to quasic-telic,
  • quasi-actus (efficient) in potency to quasi-substantial (material),
  • quasi-existential in potency to quasi-essential,

whereby, imitatively, we realize our authentic human nature as we grow from mere image (quasi) to clear likeness (REAL-ly), co-creatively fulfilling our created potential.

Not sure I’ve connected any dots or successfully unpacked my divine imaginary, but those are my categories, their semantic rules & implications for intelligible god-talk.

Further Nuancing Apophasis

Some Orthodox theologians point out that both the via positiva and via negativa are RATIONAL approaches, both sharing the same trajectory of increasing descriptive accuracy, whether through affirmation of what something is, ontologically, or is like, analogically, or through negation of what something is not or is not like. That’s how kataphasis and apophasis are largely conceived in the West, often through radically logo-centric lenses.

When Lossky employed an apophatic, perichoretic strategy, though, he referenced a transrational mystical experience moreso in terms of ineffability. He aspires merely to a successful relational reference but does not ambition a successful metaphysical description. (This distinction applies, by the way, to so much of nondual teaching in Buddhist & Hindu traditions, as they aren’t doing metaphysics as much as they are leading us into experiences or real-izations).

The Orthodox priest, Dumitru Staniloae, according to some, was more rigorous and nuanced than Lossky. He would refer to our ineffable experiences as transrational and trans-apophatic.

Such distinctions ground others, for example, a trinito-logy vs a trinito-phany.

An Afterward Regarding Univocity, Analogy & Apophasis

Our irreducibly triadic inferential cycling of abductive hypothesizing, deductive clarifying & inductive testing can fall into a sterile, nonvirtuous dyadic cycling of abduction & deduction, never gaining the realist traction that can only come from, at least, some inductive rubber hitting the epistemic road.

To be sure, sometimes, despite our mindful exploratory excursions, this happens because we’ve encountered a genuine explanatory aporia. In such cases, our alternating univocity, analogy & apophasis can make a salutary contribution to enhanced intelligibility by presenting then discarding one heuristic device after another in the form of more icons, images, diagrams, similes, metaphors & analogies.

This is analogous to our Popperian alternation of conjecture & criticism in the falsification of our abductive hypotheses via inductive testing, but unlike falsification in that, unable to critically engage inductively, it simply generates more hypotheses, more potential pathways to serve as candidates for testing, sometimes via rather weak forms of inference &, if lucky, sometimes using more robust methods.

So, the role of univocity, analogy & apophasis might best be conceived as an inference generator, souping up the abductive engine we already have. It can be thought of, too, as a meta-heuristic device, which keeps churning out heuristics.

  • When it does this using icons, images, diagrams & metaphors, our heuristics are poetic (e.g. theopoetic).
  • When using univocity, apophasis, similes & analogies, our heuristics are logocentric (e.g. theological).
  • When actively engaged by our participatory imaginations (e.g. liturgically, doxologically, theotically), such heuristics can foster interpersonal relations, trans-rationally, trans-apophatically & axiologically.

In my view, then, we best engage our Scotist, Thomist, Palamist, Aristotelian & Peircean approaches – not as explanatory metaphysics, but – as exploratory heuristics, setting forth metaphysical contours in the same way that our creeds define the theological boundaries of essential dogma.

Here’s a concrete application as an example:

An Aristotelian hylomorphism, properly conceived in a triadic semiotic sense, doesn’t compete as an explanatory metaphysic (i.e. aspiring to explain consciousness in competition with eliminativism, nonreductive physicalism, cartesian dualism, etc) but, instead, serves as an exploratory heuristic, which can guide empirical research, keeping relevant questions alive & foregrounded. It might suggest, for example, that one mustn’t conflate materialism with physicalist accounts. Instead, we best distinguish that conception of consciousness, which we properly take to be immaterial (i.e. for materialist approaches are prima facie absurd) from that of any physicalist conception of same, which needn’t necessarily be absurd (e.g. inconsistent with freedom).

The musing, above, dialogues with this conversation at Pastor Tom Belt’s Open Orthodoxy blog.

Divine Modes of Identity – Bulgakov, Balthasar & Bracken with Scotus & the Greek Fathers

Some analytic theologians would charge all trinitarian defenses with ad hoc philosophizing?

Nyet!

I intuit a general amenability of Abelardian-like syllogistics to reality writ large, i.e. beyond trinitarian logic.

It seems to me that essential, hypostatic & formal modes of identity could be applied in any noncomposite, monist ontology, e.g. materialist monism, pantheism or even a mereological panen-theism.

Aristotelian syllogistic logic can be recovered from the Abelardian-like approach precisely because the distinction between modes of identity & modes of predication collapse for composite realities, where all predications are of formal identity.

The more widely embraced pan-entheism, like classical theism, employs an ontological distinction between humans & God, where God donates & communicates creatively as we participate & are liberated imitatively.

The panen-theistic parsing employs a mereological distinction between humans & God, where God donates & communicates diffusively as we participate & are liberated substratively.

My own pan-semio-entheism, in bracketing ontology, conceives divine donation & communication both creatively & diffusively and creaturely participation & liberation both imitatively & substratively.

Because I precisely nurtured such intuitions in dialogue with Bulgakov, Balthasar & Bracken (due to my own sophiological, aesthetic & Peircean sensibilities), I was delighted to encounter Brandon Gallaher’s reflection:

The Problem of Pantheism in the Sophiology of Sergii Bulgakov: A Panentheistic Solution in the Process Trinitarianism of Joseph A. Bracken?’ in Seeking Common Ground: Evaluation and Critique of Joseph Bracken’s Comprehensive Worldview (A Festschrift for Joseph A. Bracken, S. J.), eds. Gloria Schaab and Marc Pugliese (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2012), 147-167.

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In a divine syllogistic of modes of identity, we’ve conceived the individual essences of the divine hypostases as originating in the Father and interrelating – not causally, but – as essentially dependent, hence, not subordinationist.

[re: not causally, arche, when regarded as an hypostatic idioma of the Father, in my view, can felicitously be conceived in a causal sense; it would refer to a personal cause, paternally, i.e. ad intra, a person via nature causing persons & ad extra, persons via will causing energeia & oikonomia? To be avoided would be any misconception of an impersonal and/or abstracted essence as variously causal, as well as any conceptions of either cause or person that aren’t suitably nuanced, apophatically, analogically, etc, eg I like supremely personal, trans-causal & trans-formal! I shy away from qualifying divine causalities with “quasi,” e.g. quasi-formal. I prefer, instead, to imagine that it’s we contingent, determinate beings & realities who act “quasi” on the way to becoming authentic & eternal!

For, you see, the essential, personal & formal modes of identity of divine syllogistics reflect three integrally related types of divine unity – substantial, hypostatic & dynamical – each correlatively presupposing the others. And yet, it’s the Father, as absolute unoriginate, Who secures the Trinity’s unity?

For, is it not this very monarchy that, in principle, precedes (not temporally, but in the order of intelligibility) & makes meaningful perichoresis, in the first place (pun intended)? Over against any subordinationist charges, I would simply suggest that, if there is anything like that, it’s nothing personal & isn’t substantial (puns, again, intended!).]

We have acknowledged THAT this account has ontological implications without suggesting HOW.

In Abelard’s first two modes of identity, the essential & personal, paralogisms (modalism & tritheism) present if we conceive the hypostases & ousia, respectively, as primary & secondary substances in the same Aristotelian sense that we apply to determinate being.

Happily, in the third mode, formal identity, we do have an epistemic bridge between the syllogistics of divine & determinate being.

This has all been addressed here:
Gödel & the End of Physics and Abelard et al & the End of Trinitology

Having acknowledged that there must be ontological implications for the first two modes of identity, the essential & personal, can we similarly build a bridge between the syllogistics of divine & determinate being?

Scotus has already constructed that bridge & it rather uncannily accommodates the thought of the Greek Fathers!

I have previously addressed other resonances between, for example, Scotus & Palamas.

See:

How Gelpi’s Inculturated North American Theology “Graced” my encounter with Eastern Orthodoxy

My Mon-Arche-I-tectonic Shift

I’ve been through the Desert Fathers on an Ousia with No Name — It felt good to get out of the Reign (of Rationalism) with the help of the Cappadocians.

Simply Divine or a Divinity Fudge? Cooking with Dionysius, Scotus, Peirce, Aquinas & Palamas

But how might Scotus further resonate with the approach of the Greek Fathers, beyond my previous preoccupations with divine energeia & formal modes of identity?

How might Scotus demonstrate a resonance with the Greek Fathers for the first two modes of identity, also?

How, exactly, has Scotus bridged the syllogistics of divine & determinate being?

No one more elegantly answers that question than does Richard Cross:

Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity

Cross asserts that, by employing a conception of the immanent universal, Scotus constructs an account of the doctrine of the Trinity that is conceptually compelling, philosophically coherent & closer to that found in the later Greek Fathers, from Gregory of Nyssa onward, than the Augustinian approach (predominant in Aquinas’ own) to the divine essence.

Per Cross, Scotus flips the metaphysical script in considering – not the divine persons, but – the essence as – not a secondary, but – a first substance.

In fact, Scotus doesn’t consider the divine persons substances at all, whether primary or secondary, because they are incommunicable.

The relations between the persons are nonetheless real – as exemplifications of the divine nature.

Thus, apart from the Scotistic insights into the divine energeia, economy & formal identities, which I’d focused on previously (the links above), Cross well articulates how Scotus’ doctrines also have intrinsic value & address the divine nature & persons.

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To me, the most interesting meta-metaphysical questions posed to any given metaphysic include –

Is reality, writ large,

  • 1) non|un/composite?
  • 2) non|in/determinate?
  • 3) non|in/finite?
  • 4) non|im/personal?

We can, a priori, envision (abductively) competing answers that are logically consistent & internally coherent, but, unavoidably incomplete, both axiomatically (deductively) & evidentially (inductively). Ergo, there’s an inevitable leap of faith involved in any existential opting for one or the other of these options.

What both religious & Enlightenment (e.g. Dawkins, Dennett) fundamentalists have in common is that they all fail to look over their epistemic shoulders to recognize their own leaps.

More concretely, then –

Some (e.g. materialist monists) view reality writ large as uncomposite & indeterminate, in the sense that, as a whole, the One’s simply brute & the Many dynamical causes just infinitely regress.

Others (e.g. idealist monist pantheists) view reality writ large as uncomposite & wholly determinate, in the sense that, as a whole, it’s sufficiently caused in a most thoroughgoing way. They answer the riddle of the One & the Many with The One “is” The Many.

Finally, there are various ontological dualists & pluralists, who are all over the map w/their, mostly both-and, answers to those questions & generally theistic. A lot of them are on Twitter & politely advocating all sorts of unitarian & trinitarian hypotheses!

My purpose in setting forth those meta-metaphysical questions in rather sharp relief was not just philosophical.

For sure, many “leap” existentially past materialist & pantheist construals because the first does violence to our innate aspirations to enduring values, the latter – to our universal volitional experience, each nihilistic (but in a various senses).

I want to further suggest that our philosophical categories of non|un/composite & non|in/determinate remain very much in play, theologically, for the trinitarian tensions that present, as we strive to defensibly thread the needle between tritheism & modalism.

Tritheism presents obvious problems as, exegetically & historically, we’re precommitted to the One (noncomposite deity). The more stringent a strategy for avoiding tritheism, however, the more a spectre of modalism will threaten one’s trinitology.

It is less obvious how a modalist (determinate) deity would necessarily do violence to our notions of divine & human volition, however, especially granting that the deity, modally, would still be self-determinate, humans contingently so. But, again, exegetical & historical contours circumscribe for us a much more eminent conception of the divine will, which is to say, with an intrinsically nondeterminate aspect to the divine nature that, certainly, constitutively entails self- determinate attributes, but in a way that’s essentially kenotic.

That kenotic aspect affords us a much more robust notion of freedom vis a vis the divine will & a much more eminent conception of the divine nature?

At stake in each metaphysic, then, whether philosophically or theologically, are conceptions with practical implications for the logical consistency (exegetical & historical), internal coherence & external congruence of our creedal stances toward the One & the Many (divine & determinate) and of all authentic conceptions of Freedom (divine & human).
Pneumatological kenosis: the Spirit immanentized in the gratuity of creation & Christological kenosis: the Son incarnated in the gratuity of grace, both, implicate a Paterological ur-kenosis of the Father in the generation of the Son & procession of the Spirit.
ur-kenosis entails an unoriginate, nondeterminate, principium, an idioma of the Father, eternally self-emptying in (self)determinate relating thru eternal generation of Son & procession of Spirit. Nothing modal. Hypostatic & personal in gratuitous ad intra & ad extra dynamism.

Father-Son-Holy Spirit [FSH]

FSH denotations, while epistemic denotations, have ontic not modal connotations (neither phenomenal nor noumenal).
A concurrent noumenal modalism suggests that the Persons are “three ways that God really is.”
Rahner’s “distinct manners of subsisting” derives from the Summae’seach of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature” and in continuity with Gregory of Nyssa.

Hence, there are three subsistences, lacking the same formal identity, not one formal identity taking on three different manners of subsisting, i.e. ‘three ways that God really is.”

FSH denotations refer to divine hypostatic realities or idiomata like nondeterminate persons (EO), exemplifications (Scotist) or subsistences (Thomist) that are analogous to determinate persons (psychological), haecceities (Scotist) or instantiations & primary substances (Thomist).
FSH denotations do not refer to divine substantial realities or propria like nondeterminate ousia, essence or primary substances (Scotist) that are analogous to determinate essence, form, quiddity (Scotist) or secondary substances (Thomist).

As the most fecund metaphysics have rejected this phenomenal-noumenal distinction, the best systematic theologies have, too.

Such classical, disjunctive, dyadic conceptions as the phenomenal vs noumenal, epistemic vs ontic, essentialism vs nominalism, idealism vs realism, logical vs efficient causes, etc all represent two sides of the same bankrupt coinage of our metaphysical realm. If it has no metaphysical currency, that’s precisely because it presupposes the impossibility of metaphysics.

In the most robust metaphysical systems (classical realisms), the structures of objective knowledge remain – not dyadic, but – irreducibly triadic, introducing a third category – mediation (variously, but indispensably, accounted for & articulated). I’ve no space to explicate that here, but, classically, we encounter this triadicity in Aristotelian-Thomist & Scotist accounts and, more recently, in Peirce’s semiotic realism. Various triadic thought systems have indeed presented ubiquitously across cultures & throughout history.

The chief problem with any radically apophatic, trinitarian ignosticism is that it’s epistemically corrosive. It inevitably & successively will reduce to theological & metaphysical ignosticisms, which, in turn, will, necessarily & correlatively, also annihilate our highly speculative theoretical sciences.

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Metaphysical Account of Substantial (Being or Esse) & Hypostatic (Existant or Subject) Modes of Determinate Being
Modal temporality categories include possible, actual, probable & necessary.
Modal adequacy categories include mereological (whole/part/noncomposite) & non|in/finite.
Modal ontology categories include descriptions & references to specific hypostatic realities (determinate persons, instantiations or haecceities or primary substances) with attributions to their precise properties (determinate essence, form, quiddity or secondary substance).
Semantic Univocity & Ontic Analogy of Being
logical categories for dogma e.g. ‘distinct manner of subsisting’ (subsistenzweisen)
ontic categories for systematics
Metaphysical Account of Substantial (Being or Esse) & Hypostatic Modes of Identity of Nondeterminate Being
Modal indentity categories include apophatic references (idiomata) to specific hypostatic realities (nondeterminate persons, exemplifications or subsistences) with apophatic attributions (propria) to their precise properties (nondeterminate ousia, essence or primary substance)
Formal Modes of Identity of Nondeterminate & Determinate Being
Theopoetic Account of Substantial (Being or Esse) & Hypostatic Modes of Nondeterminate Identity
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How Gelpi’s Inculturated North American Theology “Graced” my encounter with Eastern Orthodoxy

My old acquaintance (45 years) & fellow yat (New Orleanian), the late Jesuit, Don Gelpi, articulated a normative theology of conversion.

His account integrated

  • Edwards’ aesthetic object (i.e. Christology),
  • Royce’s ethical dynamism &
  • Peirce’s logical semiotic, while reframing
  • Lonergan’s conversions in terms of experience.

Palamas’ energies, Stăniloae’s affirmation of direct contemplative experience & Bulgakov’s created Sophia seemed to me to fit just such a view & so did von Balthasar’s outlook.

This all squares with an account of faith that’s neither arational nor rationalistic, but defensibly & coherently trans-rational.

Many others are running with Gelpi’s account in other fruitful directions. For example, see Mark Grave’s “Gracing Neuroscientific Tendencies of the Embodied Soul,”
__Philosophy and Theology 26 (1):97-129 (2014) __, wherein he models the brain’s biology using the dispositional tendencies of nature—characterized by Jonathan Edwards, C. S. Peirce & the Jesuit philosophical theologian Donald Gelpi.

Also, see my own project, a tehomic pan-semio-entheism, which affirms a creatio ex profundis within mostly classical theistic contours:

https://paxamoretbonum.wordpress.com/2018/12/02/in-dialogue-with-boyd-on-hartshorne-neville-on-divine-freedom/

https://paxamoretbonum.wordpress.com/2018/11/29/my-mon-arche-i-tectonic-shift/

https://www.academia.edu/26023098/Reasons_and_Values_of_the_Heart_in_a_Pluralistic_World_Toward_a_Contemplative_Phenomenology_for_Interreligious_Dialogue

Reconciling Origen & Bulgakov’s Eternal Creation with Athanasius & Lossky’s Creation In Time

Bulgakov seems to echo Origen regarding eternal creation, but Lossky – Athanasius, who deemed creation in time from God’s will rather than nature.

Related to distinctions of Norris Clarke: esse naturale v intentionale & Palamas: essence v energies.

Catherine Keller’s tehomic panentheism via creatio ex profundis makes sense to me as an eternal act, where the order of existence was the formless void of Genesis.

CS Peirce affirms the atemporal Reality of God, where Being > Reality > Existence, denying God’s an existent. To that being:reality distinction, I impute naturale:intentionale & essence:energy distinctions.

The Reality of God would freely proceed as energeia, per divine will, diffusing the tehom’s substrative forms w/divinizing finalities, that they may participate imitatively.

Eternal creatio ex profundis & an in-time creatio continua preserve divine transcendence without sacrificing an intimate relationality, integral to a more robustly personalistic theology. (I’m trying to reconcile these approaches in resonance w/some of Staniloae’s intuitions.)

Notes:

Re: exemplary or imaginal causes, debates arise as to whether they reduce to formal, final or even efficient causes. Some even include them as a 5th cause (material causation the only one not already mentioned here). In determinate reality, w/a an irreducibly triadic modal ontology, where existence, efficient & formal causes are acts, & essence, material & final causes are potencies, & where modal probabilities map to formal distinctions, this integral irreducibility of properties, haecceities & relations might account for such confusion? I point out such confusion b/c, for some theologians, exemplars, exemplarity & exemplarism in God are central. And if confusion reigns re same in created realities … Once adopted, though, a symphonic harmony of integrally related, inseparable dynamics ensue, like, for example, generation, creation, emanation, communication, incarnation, manifestation, participation, consummation, etc, which similarly will evoke various notions of causation (e.g. efficient, final & exemplary). The identity of manifold uncreated exemplars w/ the divine essence preserves simplicity as they’re non-beings, known but not real. As for created beings, they’re cognized by God’s cognizing Himself as their Cause. His creating the cosmos, as an accidental Cambridge property, is compatible w/simplicity. It’s also compatible w/an infinitely non-compelled act, i.e. w/freedom as apophatically predicated, guaranteeing its logical consistency w/other God-conceptions, ergo, a trans-freedom (non-anthropomorphic quality). I lean toward the stance of Bulgakov, who seems to echo Origen regarding eternal creation, though sympathetic to Lossky, too, who followed Athanasius in deeming creation in time as from God’s will rather than nature. But, where was I when the morning stars sang together?