To say or not of G_d?
3 semantically who
4 cardinally & 5 ordinally
a hypostatic being
b essential being
MOF says there is (2b) a sole personal (4a) source (5a), Who (3) is the original (5a) freely-loving-willing One (4a).
In the MOF, the name, Father, names (3) neither the essential being (4 or 5 b) nor the economy (2a) but a relationship (5a).
The (in obliquo) unity of the essence (4b) can be deduced (in recto) from the relationships (2b) initiated (5a) by the willing One (4a).
Did Augustine, from that unity (4 & 5 a) & unicity (4b), deduce the plurality of relationships (2b), & even conceptually relate the economic (temporal missions – 2a) to the immanent (eternal processions – 2b)?
Indeed, Augustine conceived the Spirit’s eternal procession (5a & 2b) as gift, love itself, economically (2a), & seems to infer the filioque from the homoousion, all with an aim of further emphasizing both the personal unity (4 & 5 a) & essential unicity (4b) of the Trinity.
What Augustine did NOT do was deduce from the unicity (4b), alone, the plurality of relationships (2b), e.g. ignoring the hypostatic unity (4 & 5 a).
Nor did Augustine logically derive the immanent (eternal processions – 2b) from the economic (temporal missions – 2a).
Augustine was, instead, constructing, as a supplement, a theophanic pneumatology to further illuminate the Spirit’s procession.
Did it threaten the MOF or subordinate the HS?
Does it constitute the S as aition?
Does it necessarily methodologically invoke a strict correspondence between the immanent & economic?
If received as theologoumenon, no.
However, hermeneutical questions regarding whether a Scriptural term or text applies to God’s economic activity ad extra or to His inner life, ad intra – absolutely to God’s being, in a dogmatically normative way, that best be discerned ecumenically & formulated conciliarly?
Now, insofar as we are imago Dei of the freely-loving-willing One, wherein absolute freedom & love are inseparable aspects of the pure act of willing, would not our own freedom be similarly constitued, as it grows in that likeness?
Our freedom would thus not be constituted of that license to do merely what we want (Lord Acton) via a libertarian capitulation to the passive inclinations of our natural will (Scotus) with its necessary affections to our own advantage (albeit epistemically & axiologically distanced).
Our freedom would be constituted of that authentic liberty to do what we clearly must (Acton), as a volition that, while so free it can abstain from willing, when it does choose to will, cannot not will the highest good per its free appetite, which is actively inclined by affections toward justice, as always driven, in friendship & love, by desire of something for the sake of another (Scotus).
This Scotistic conception of free will (radically) relocates it from a telic (per Thomistic naturalism) to an efficient cause.
Scotus views moral goodness aesthetically, as a beauty of the soul, in line with sources in Platonic & Neoplatonic traditions, further evident in later Middle Ages thanks to Augustine, Dionysius, etc
Not arbitrary, but beyond the rational, divinely legislated moral laws harmonize with aesthetic patterns pleasing to God.
See: Bychkov, Oleg. (2014). “In Harmony with Reason”: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics. Open Theology. 1. 10.2478/opth-2014-0005.
Human moral & theotic realizations embody aesthetic patterns pleasing to a God, Who “is truly, `really’, personally related to the world by relations of knowledge & mutual love.” And, because of this, through such embodiments of those aesthetic patterns, God’s “affected in consciousness, but not in abiding intrinsic perfection of nature,” that is in aesthetic scope, but not intensity.
[passibility phraseology borrowed from Norris Clarke ]
The coherence of any conceptions of divine freedom, human liberty and evil (ontological privation) are at stake.
Regarding human liberty, terms like voluntarist, intellectualist, compatibilist, determinist & libertarian have become so fraught as to be unhelpful.
The free will, generically speaking, inheres in human nature, formally, and is expressed as an efficient cause via active potency. As such, it’s a phylogenetically emergent reality. It represents a teleologic, sapient intentionality that’s distinct from and transcends our teleo-qualic sentience, teleo-nomic biological processes & teleo-matic physico-chemical constitution, all which contribute to what we refer to as our natural will.
The free (teleologic) will grows the strength of its inherent autonomous nature through habitual virtuous exercise. This growth in volitional virtue is enhanced as intellectual, affective, moral & social conversions transform our natural will, taming its teleo-matic, -nomic & -qualic passive potencies, formatively & developmentally, harnessing, then redirecting, their energies, in the service of ongoing religious conversion, as expressed in the love of God, others, cosmos, even self. With Bulgakov, there’s no reason this dynamic must necessarily cease post mortem.
In some sense, then, the ontogenetic development of the free will, analogously, recapitulates its phylogenetic emergence. It’s constitutive of, not added on to, human nature via the gratuity of creation and can be superabundantly elevated via the gratuity of grace, in both cases animated by the presence of the Spirit.
The free will also resembles God’s will, growing from image to likeness.
If we conceive God’s choices in terms of those that, on one hand, are logically necessary 1) as strict natural laws via 2) per se nota propositions 3) exercised in perfect goodness & 4) chosen with superabundant efficiency, on the other hand, represent choices on a multiversal Pareto frontier, allowing for diverse, harmonious aesthetic patterns to be realized, then no arbitrariness obtains. So, too, then for the human will, which can be either logically constrained, volitionally, or aesthetically equipoised, although any superabundant sufficiency is manifestly inferior in finite beings. Intelligent creatures remain always volitionally positioned with not choosing as an option.
To avoid a collapse into determinism & problems of evil, a proper tehomic panentheism can be invoked, which I have introduced elsewhere previously, a creatio ex profundis, where an ex nihilo conception still obtains via the invitation to novel teloi. Also, a neglected divine omnipathy of how creatures will have felt, given the illumination of final beatitude in the balance with lifetime sufferings, plays a role.
To imagine an exercise of the free will as independent of existential telic orientations is nonsense.
Volition involves the intellect & will. Any “libertarian” aspect of the will must not refer to why this or that is chosen but only to why the will wills at all, because it does remain free not to act. The will refers to the sole rational potency, never acting without the intellect. So any “voluntarist” aspect of the will must refer to such a primacy of the will that presupposes the intellect. Scotus meets these criteria, so could only be characterized, at most, as moderately libertarian and moderately voluntarist and most definitely not determinist.
The intellect always functions in tandem with the will as partial co-cause for volition.
We have to look not at why the will wills this or that, but rather why the will wills at all. In Scotist terminology, this means looking at the act of velle/non velle, not the act of velle/nolle, where Scotus holds that the non velle is indeed an act: it is an act of self-restraint within the will. This act reveals the will’s relationship to itself and, ultimately, why, when all conditions are present, the will is free not to act. One cannot, then, make the libertarian connection between the divine and human wills on the basis of the choice between “this or that” (in other words, the velle/nolle distinction). Any libertarian claim to be made from this sort of analysis would have to be moderate.
For Scotus, the divine nature is simple and the will is the sole rational potency. Therefore, any interpretation that either denies the will’s access to reason or attempts to defend a notion of freedom that does not entail rationality cannot be faithful to Scotus. For him, the will (whether human or divine) enjoys a freedom that is undetermined by external factors precisely because it is rational.
In the Lectura, Scotus presents this solution of partial cocausality as moderate, rejecting both the extreme voluntarism of Henry of Ghent and the extreme intellectualism of Godfrey of Fontaines. In this way, he attempts to save free will from the blindness of Henry’s position and the intellectual determinism of Godfrey. It is important to note that Scotus’s understanding of the will as sole rational potency is key to the sort of voluntarist he is.
Not Mutually Exclusive Conceptions for my Tehomic Pan-semio-entheism
Griffin’s creatio ex chaos (uncreated & prevenient)
Bracken’s divine matrix [a Peircean corrective to nominalism Whiteheadian (thick) or Hartshornean (thin)]
Clarke’s thin passibility of esse intentionale
Neville’s creatio ex nihilo & Tillich’s ground for nondeterminate divine being
Orthodoxy’s Monarchy of the Father for – Unoriginate Indeterminate Divine Being
Classical Theism’s Immanent Trinity – Indeterminate Being or Peirce’s Ens Necessarium
Peirce’s Being > Reality > Existence
Classical Theism’s Economic Trinity – Self-determinate Being
Meta-nomological Reality & Meta-ontological Existence
In/Determinate Reality – Peircean Thirdness
In/Determinate Existence – Peircean Secondness
Peircean Firstness – of both an Extreme Scotistic Realism for immanent universals & Moderate Scotistic Realism for universals
Keller’s creatio ex profundis (created chaos) which can exist along side Griffin’s uncreated prevenient chaos
Oord’s creatio ex amore, which as creatio continua (consistent w/conceivable cyclic cosmogonies) interacts with prevenient chaos (created & uncreated)
Scotistic Volition – moderately libertarian & moderately voluntarist free will
Scotism generally – cf Nielsen, Ingham, Cross, Wolster, Horan, Kappes
Theological Anthropology of Lonergan as corrected by Donald Gelpi replacing Transcendental Thomist approach with Peirce’s pragmatic semiotic realism
All as generally set out: